Article in other languages: GER – ESP
On November 24, 2025, a delegation from the parliamentary commission established to adress the Kurdish question traveled to the Turkish prison island of Imrali to meet with Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. The delegation consisted of Gülistan Kılıç Koçyığıt, deputy parliamentary group leader of the Equality and Democracy Party (DEM); Hüseyin Yaman, deputy chairman of the AKP; and Feti Yıldız, deputy chairman of the MHP. The parliament has now published the full transcript of the meeting. In it, Öcalan comments in detail on domestic and foreign policy, the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish question and Turkey’s future. His warning is particularly clear: if Syria is not democratized, an authoritarian development is foreseeable, even under the self-proclaimed interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Below is the transcript in English translation:
At the beginning of the meeting, Abdullah Öcalan stated that the Kurdish question is a problem going back thousands of years and could be divided into three historical phases. He said that any solution must take account of the respective political and social circumstances. He wanted to address a fundamental error made in history and to do so with respect for Feti Yıldız’s ideological positions.
Öcalan emphasised that his first political socialisation occurred within Ülkü Ocakları, an ultra‑nationalist youth organisation which he initially sought out in Ankara. That is where his political career began. In his view, the Kurdish question has moved from being a state issue to a political one; this requires the subject to be dealt with through dialogue with political actors—a development he regards as significant progress.
At the outset of the conversation, he explicitly thanked the President [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan], and the chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli. Bahçeli, he said, had shown a kind of courage rarely seen in the republic’s history, which deserved special recognition. He stood by all of his previous statements and, if conditions allowed, believed he could translate his proposals into action, both theoretically and in practice.
Öcalan also acknowledged Devlet Bahçeli’s contributions to the structure of Turkish‑Kurdish relations, which span more than a century. He noted that channels of contact and dialogue between himself and the PKK on one side and the Turkish state on the other had existed since the time of Turgut Özal’s government (beginning in 1992) and continued during the terms of Erdal İnönü and Süleyman Demirel. Nevertheless, there were always actors within the state who sought to prevent a political resolution of the Kurdish question; whenever that happened, a “coup mechanism” was activated to sabotage the process.
When Hüseyin Yayman pointed to the particular sensitivity of families of fallen soldiers, Öcalan stressed that every soldier’s death is for him a personal tragedy. He said he had never rejoiced over the death of soldiers, saying young people should not die in this way. Yet, if Turkey and the wider region could achieve a sustainable solution—opening “the right door in the right way”—a historic opportunity would arise that could not only bring peace but also reshape the entire political landscape, he added.
If the current process fails, Öcalan warned, there is a risk that the familiar “coup mechanism” will be reactivated—with possible consequences even for leading figures such as MHP chairman Devlet Bahçeli and the President. Bahçeli himself has already spoken of this danger, he noted.
To illustrate this dynamic, Öcalan recalled an interview with journalist Mehmet Ali Birand in 1988 which was conducted without official permission. After the broadcast, the then‑president, Turgut Özal, telephoned Birand and said, “What have you done, Mehmet Ali? You’ve burned me.” Four days after the interview appeared in the newspaper Milliyet, an assassination attempt was made against Özal. On 17 April—on the day of a scheduled meeting with his chief of staff Kaya Toperi—Özal suddenly died. Öcalan voiced doubts about the official account of his death and spoke of a possible cover‑up.
If today’s process collapses, responsibility will lie not only with Devlet Bahçeli but with the entire MHP, just as political attacks have previously been directed against President Erdoğan, Öcalan said. He said his interlocutors know very well how he has repeatedly been made a scapegoat. He stated that attacks on him are, at their core, attacks on the idea of peace and legally grounded fraternity. Some actors, he said, deliberately act as “agents of influence” and work against a peace process. He reiterated Bahçeli’s warning: if this problem is not resolved, nothing will remain of Anatolia or of Turkishness.
Öcalan then recalled Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s words about the Battle of Çanakkale. Atatürk assured relatives of fallen ANZAC soldiers, “Your martyrs are our martyrs too.” In that spirit, Öcalan expressed the wish that the families of Turkish martyrs would view him in a similar light. He said he looks respectfully on the bereaved and fully understands the depth of their pain.
Regarding his own past, Öcalan recounted that in an earlier conversation with the head of military intelligence service, JİTEM, he had emphasised that the present form of the conflict was not solely his responsibility: “You have brought this problem to this state and placed it in my lap. The entire blame does not rest with me.” He also noted that four senior military commanders had told him his execution would be approved if political progress were not achieved.
Öcalan underlined that for him there is no option other than a democratic solution. He referred to geopolitical developments such as the “Abraham Accords” brokered by the United States with support from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which he sees as a strategic project that is currently being implemented. Parallel to that, there is a “Shiite project logic” pursued particularly by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even if this seems to be receding at present, the ambitions behind it remain active, he added.
Turning to Turkey’s internal peace process, Öcalan said that despite current tensions and a difficult testing phase, the process is at a critical juncture. It is not merely a question of goodwill but of opening a door that could shape not only the next hundred years but an entire millennium—both in terms of historical continuity and in terms of an immediate moment of peace and reconciliation, he said.
Despite what he called “intolerable rhetoric” in the media, Öcalan insisted that Turkey faces a real and pressing challenge with the Kurdish question and that he and his movement seek a definitive resolution. He praised political gestures: Devlet Bahçeli, for instance, symbolically extended his hand, and President Erdoğan in Malazgirt called for strengthening national unity. Bahçeli’s response, once again, was an offer of dialogue.
At the same time, Öcalan criticised the fact that different and contradictory voices—from moderate to violent—had emerged from the PKK‑controlled Qandil Mountains. He was particularly troubled by the attack on the Turkish defence company TUSAŞ, which he felt harmed the process. He noted that Devlet Bahçeli had publicly quoted his own words: “If I am given the opportunity, I am ready to serve the state.” Bahçeli, he said, had even suggested that Öcalan, if granted the “right to hope,” should address the DEM Party’s parliamentary group—an invitation of historic significance. Öcalan reaffirmed his commitment: if circumstances permit, he believes he can contribute both in theory and in practice.
Öcalan explained that there have always been members of Turkish origin within the organisation. That group is currently headed by Duran Kalkan, a long‑time functionary of Turkish descent. This structure, he said, has historical continuity and has been part of the organisation’s identity from the beginning. He noted that when his thoughts were conveyed to the leadership in Qandil, a unilateral ceasefire was declared, and the organisation has so far adhered to it. The movement referred to what is known as the 27 February declaration, which laid out a roadmap for resolving the Kurdish question. Every statement in that context, he said, carries programmatic weight: “every statement is a programme.” Feti Yıldız replied, “We are aware of that.”
Öcalan recalled that in his public declaration he had set out in detail how the Kurdish question could be solved. He said the leadership in Qandil fully abided by the guidelines laid down there. As a result, the PKK dissolved itself. As part of this process, under the leadership of Bese (Hülya Oran), a symbolic “weapon surrender” took place—an act of responsibility that Öcalan explicitly praised. By his count, 70 percent of the measures he demanded have thus already been implemented. In the next phase, those members operating in Turkey, under the leadership of Sabri Ok, withdrew completely from the country.
Looking back, Öcalan described the first year of the process as successful. During that period, no soldiers were killed and there were no armed clashes. This not only calmed the situation but also opened a significant political space, leading to increased public support. He was confident that the remaining issues that still caused uncertainty in parts of the population could be resolved. Citing Devlet Bahçeli, he emphasised that continuing the process requires that he be allowed access to functioning channels of communication.
Reflecting on the 1990s, Öcalan remembered that then‑president Süleyman Demirel publicly acknowledged the “Kurdish reality” during a visit to Mardin. Demirel sent Kurdish politicians Ahmet Türk and Sırrı Sakık to Aleppo with the following message to him: “We will recognise the Kurdish identity if you lay down your weapons.” That opportunity, in Öcalan’s view, was not taken advantage of, even though Demirel was seriously trying to find a solution.
Necmettin Erbakan made an effort in 1997, Öcalan noted. In that context, he was received by Hafez Assad and his vice‑president, Abd al‑Halim Khaddam, and was given three letters. Shortly afterward, however, the military memorandum of 28 February took place. The letters included a kind of framework agreement that envisaged, among other things, five years’ immunity and the exclusion of political rights, but in the end, he was never given a chance to implement it. According to Öcalan, the National Security Council made contact with Sabri Ok and others in 1997 as part of a project known as “Relations with Society.” This process stalled, which Öcalan attributes to outside intervention. He quoted the then commander‑in‑chief of the armed forces, Atilla Ateş, who said publicly in Kilis, “If no agreement is reached, we will occupy Syria within two days.”
Öcalan went on to recount his assessment that there was intensive international coordination, well known to him, conducted through the Israeli intelligence service Mossad. Similar to the case of Yasser Arafat, he was effectively told: “Either Stockholm or northern Iraq—you will not be allowed to set foot anywhere else in this world.” To escape this scenario, he first waited in northern Iraq for a solution. Then, unexpectedly, the opportunity to leave from Athens arose. In Athens, he was received by a senior official of the Greek Secret Service named Stavrakis, who told him: “Without approval from Oslo you will not get out of here—we will not even let you return to your own country.” Öcalan said he was astonished by these words.
He then travelled unexpectedly to Moscow. There he was received by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whom he described as being of Jewish origin. He was told that at best they could hide him in a private house, but there were no further options. Öcalan could not understand how an official political party could hide him in Moscow. Eventually it became clear that he would not find refuge anywhere in the world except under Mossad protection. This message, he said, ran like a thread through the subsequent events. He was taken on to Dushanbe, where he was left waiting in freezing temperatures for several hours. That the formerly socialist and communist Moscow had come to such a state was hard for him to grasp.
He then travelled onward to Rome, but there too he was told that the CIA and Mossad controlled every movement. A renewed attempt to return to Athens failed. Finally, at Minsk airport, he was told he would have to live as a “stateless person” in the future. Öcalan described this treatment as humiliating. The last stop of this phase was Nairobi, where the situation spiralled completely out of the control of the forces involved.
While staying in Nairobi, he said a British diplomat—whom he believed to be an intelligence officer—handed him a firearm. The diplomat explained that the weapon was his only security and that he should keep it with him. Later, Öcalan said, members of the Turkish military intelligence apparatus, JİTEM, told him in hindsight, “Had you used that weapon, we would definitely have killed you there.” He related this episode because he believes it concerns Devlet Bahçeli directly: if he himself is kept out of the political process, a protracted, perhaps century‑long conflict between Turks and Kurds will be unavoidable. This danger, he said, is real and extremely important.
There are, Öcalan said, no Turks without Kurds and no Kurds without Turks. Devlet Bahçeli embraces this insight. At the root of this thinking is republican ideology, linked to a positivist understanding of the state. This ideology implies the need for elimination—not only of the Kurds but also of the Turkmens, whose distinctiveness has likewise been weakened. Öcalan explained that he was outlining these connections to show how historical wounds emerged and what factors led to the Kurdish uprisings. These ideological premises, he observed, continue to have an effect in Turkey to this day, something his interlocutors understand well. The roots of all uprisings lie in this tension.
Speaking of the Sheikh Said uprising, Öcalan said that the ideology of the War of Independence was originally presented as an Islamic‑Ummah unity. When the state departed from that line, a breach of trust led to the uprising. At this point, Feti Yıldız remarked that not all of these events should be categorised as uprisings; many were acts of terror. Öcalan responded that all Kurdish uprisings were labelled as such in historical accounts, including his own. Even though he has been portrayed as part of a modern liberation struggle or guerrilla movement, it never transcended the stage of an ethnically Kurdish uprising. A qualitative transformation has not occurred; instead, the conflict has become increasingly tragic.
He said that as early as 1993 he wanted to end this state of affairs. At that time, president Turgut Özal sent him a message through Kurdish politician Jalal Talabani. Özal told him: “Not everything you have done is wrong. You have helped make the Kurdish identity visible. But if you stick to armed strategy, all your efforts will be in vain.” Öcalan conceded that this assessment was correct. Although he thought a lot about it, he responded too late. Looking back, he was too young and inexperienced when this historic opportunity arose—one that ended abruptly with Özal’s sudden death.
Öcalan told the commission members that their observations and assessments are of scientific value to him. He said they should make it clear to the public that “science itself arrives at these conclusions.” The existing public narrative, he said, is often marked by serious distortions. For historical context, he mentioned that in a letter smuggled to him in prison, it was claimed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire began with the onset of Kurdish uprisings. Sultan Abdülhamid, he said, recognised this development and responded by founding the so‑called Hamidiye schools—a measure Öcalan described as extremely significant.
Likewise, Sultan Abdülmecid tried to find a friendly solution with the Kurdish principalities (Mirlik). In that era, however, the Russian Tsarist Empire and France were simultaneously working to establish an Assyrian state in Syria and an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. Against this historical backdrop, Öcalan welcomed Devlet Bahçeli’s statements on Jerusalem and Salah ad‑Din al‑Ayyūbī. He agreed that the capture of Jerusalem by Ayyūbī could only have been achieved through the unity of Turks and Kurds—an example that today can serve as a historical reference point for dialogue.
Öcalan said his grandmother was of Turkmen origin. In that context, he referred to the Seljuk sultan Sanjar, who chose Hamadan—the former capital of Median civilisation—as his capital. These historical references, he said, taught him that there can be no life in this region without the mutual existence of Turks and Kurds: “a Kurdishness without Turks and a Turkishness without Kurds is not possible in this geography.” As a historical example of this mutual dependence, he cited Sultan Alp Arslan’s victory at the Battle of Manzikert (1071), attributing it to support from the Kurdish Marwanid emirates of Silvan and Kurdish rule in Ahlat—an alliance he read about in the works of historian Osman Turan.
He emphasised that Kurdish forces also widely fought on the Seljuks’ side at Manzikert. While the conquest of Anatolia is often portrayed as a Turkish victory, he said, it should be remembered that expansion as far as the Euphrates—roughly to Şanlıurfa and Malatya—also gave breathing space to the Kurdish communities. Öcalan quoted a reported remark by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is said to have told a tribal leader in Beyazıt during the War of Independence: “If we fight against each other in this war, there will be neither Kurdistan nor Turkey—we will both lose.” The lesson, he said, was that survival was only possible in unity. The War of Independence was ultimately won, and the Kurdish contribution cannot be ignored, he added.
Öcalan drew attention to two recent conferences: one held in Erbil and another, a Jewish‑Kurdish congress, in Germany. He regarded both events as highly significant and asked whether his interlocutors were aware of them. Feti Yıldız replied that he was. Öcalan explained that he mentioned these events to shed light on the power and influence of the Israeli intelligence service Mossad.
He recalled being on board an aircraft that was not allowed to land in any NATO country in Europe—a situation he interpreted as evidence of an unprecedented international control regime. He said what stood out was not just the extent of the control but the fact that it was ultimately a Turk who “brought him down.” This, he said, was a symbolic act intended to place the organisation under foreign control. Had that plan succeeded, a wave of assassinations and targeted killings would have begun, comparable to the escalation in Gaza. People at the time were already self‑immolating; it was an apocalyptic situation, he added.
Even today, he emphasised, it is important that his interlocutors do not conceal these dynamics but speak of them openly. He said the issues he raised have lost none of their relevance. History has unfolded in this way, and he himself took far‑reaching steps without hesitation. To interpret the present correctly, these historical facts must be known; that is why he made them public. It is his interlocutors, he concluded, who now have the opportunity to influence the fate of the Middle East. “I am passing the ball to you,” he said.
Öcalan stated that he wanted to explain what, in his view, were the causes of the PKK’s armed uprising, why he ultimately decided to end it and how the risk dynamics behind it work. He stressed that things are not always as they appear at first glance and urged his interlocutors not to misunderstand him. Even if some of his assessments might be bluntly expressed, it is important to take all possible scenarios seriously, he added. Political reality is complex, and his own experience, he said, was extensive.
He noted that forces seeking to sabotage the process wield significant influence, but strategic distinctions must still be made. Öcalan said he knows the MHP and its internal workings very well. If party members did not regard Devlet Bahçeli as legitimate, they would neither support nor stand behind him, he noted. This loyalty, in his view, reflects a conscious line within the party. The recent decision of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) within the commission was striking, he added. At the same time, he clarified that his remark should by no means be seen as an attempt to exclude the CHP from political dialogue.
Öcalan observed that something is happening in Syria—he knows the country very well, having spent twenty years of his life there. In some respects, the commission members are ahead of him, while in others he has deeper insights. He announced that he would later address questions of greater importance to society as a whole.
Looking back, he said that the PKK should have been dissolved as early as 1993. He described the relationship between Turks and Kurds as symbiotic. In that context, he referred to the thinker Ziya Gökalp, whose Kurdish origin and simultaneous shaping of Turkish nationalism he sees as a significant symbol. Anatolian Turkishness, according to Öcalan, has been strongly influenced by Kurdishness, while Kurdish Mesopotamia historically oriented itself toward Anatolia.
For this reason, he said, it is not enough for the PKK to abandon armed struggle; a mental and ideological end to hostility must also occur. Despite a shared history marked by uprisings, wars and conflicts, a historic fraternity exists between the two peoples. At this point, Feti Yıldız commented that despite all the violence and tension, no blanket hostility toward Kurds has ever taken root in Turkish society. Even in times when news of martyrs circulated, no one smashed the windows of their Kurdish neighbours—an expression of deeply rooted civil coexistence.
Öcalan stressed that Turks and Kurds have lived in close proximity and mutual intertwining for more than a thousand years. This shared historical heritage, he said, must not be suppressed. For example, he said, the Karakeçili Turkmens in the Şanlıurfa region are “culturally more Kurdish than I am.” The Germiyanoğulları dynasty was originally of Kurdish origin but became largely “Turkified” over time. He remarked that these historical facts must be taken seriously and not denied. Both identities deserve mutual respect, and any attempt to erase the other is not only dangerous but a deliberate trap.
Öcalan stated that since 1995 he has distanced himself from the idea of real‑socialism. The accompanying mental transformation was a painful process. That transformation has now occurred, he said, and it is necessary to break with the logic of armed struggle intellectually as well. He acknowledged that practical implementation takes time: organisation members must be prepared for this shift step by step. He noted that Duran Kalkan has been even clearer than he himself is in opposing the use of weapons and has repeatedly said, “We will never take up arms again.”
He considered the issue of Syria as important as Turkey’s internal situation. He maintained close relationships with the Assad family for a long time and lived under their direct protection in Syria. Today, he said, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) possess—with the support of the United States and Israel—an armed force of at least 100,000 fighters, far more than is commonly acknowledged. This structure is not confined to certain regions but has also spread to neighbouring areas.
Although he has not received the official documents from the above‑mentioned congresses, Öcalan underscored the political symbolism of two recent events: the Jewish‑Kurdish Congress in Europe and the sixth Middle East Peace and Security Forum in Erbil. In his view, their message can be summarised as follows: “While we are seeking a solution here on İmralı, efforts toward a solution are also being made there.”
Öcalan said that Ferhat Abdi Şahin [also known as Mazloum Abdi, commander‑in‑chief of the SDF] is one of the people closest to him and most loyal to him. He reported that both the conference in Erbil and the Jewish‑Kurdish Congress in Europe were held under the patronage of German actors. In those contexts, the claim was made that “Apo is the greatest obstacle today—just as Kurds stand on the threshold of statehood.” Öcalan countered that his political goal is not a Kurdish state but the model of a “democratic society.” In the contrast between democratic society and the nation‑state, he sees the real line of conflict between himself and other Kurdish forces advocating statehood. He also offered a geopolitical assessment: Israel has a fundamental interest in the Kurds. The strategic order in the Middle East, he argued, is closely tied to Kurdish geopolitics; without it, Israel cannot assert its hegemonic ambitions in the region.
He compared the situation directly: just as the Republic of Turkey can be seen as a “proto‑Israel,” Kurdish statehood would be a kind of “post‑Israel state model.” Just as Israel’s establishment once required a republican structure, Israel today needs a Kurdish state as a geopolitical pillar for lasting dominance in the Middle East; without it, it cannot survive or be hegemonic. Recently, Öcalan said, he had heard that propaganda was circulating claiming that the establishment of a Kurdish state was being deliberately sabotaged by him. He emphasised that this is a highly relevant observation: there are forces doing everything to derail the project. Yet on his side there is one crucial advantage: his own authority within the Kurdish movement remains strong.
He drew a parallel: just as Devlet Bahçeli is a key figure in Turkish nationalism, he himself occupies a comparable role within the Kurdish movement—not only in Turkey but also in Iran, Iraq and Syria. In his view, neither Israel’s Abraham‑Accords model nor Iran’s “Shiite project” serves regional stability or the national interests of the states concerned. Instead, he said, the focus should be on a concept of democratic integration as a long‑term viable alternative to sectarian or ethno‑nationalist fragmentation.
Öcalan insisted that emphasis must be placed on a democratic Kurdish form of organisation without striving for a separate state. He explicitly said he is not speaking of a state model. Just as his interlocutors support a vision of democratic nationalism, he advocates what he calls “democratic communitarianism”. This is not a state‑centred proposal. Devlet Bahçeli, he said, understands this very well. At this point, Feti Yıldız explained that from the commission’s perspective, there is likewise no desire for a state‑forming process, no federal structure and no autonomy—a position that Öcalan expressly confirmed.
Öcalan made it clear: “The state we seek is the Republic of Turkey.” The Kurds should find their place in the Middle East within this state—through democratic self‑organisation within the existing framework, not by seceding. He said this has nothing to do with federal autonomy. It is not his invention, but what he calls true socialism—a lesson he has tried to impart to the political left. In his view, the collapse of historical socialism stems from a wrong understanding of socialism itself. Consequently, the idea of democratic society must be integrated with the principles of the republic.
Öcalan explained that the word “commune” comes from Kurdish and means community or assembly. In the medieval context, it was equivalent to communal municipalism—a form of population communitarisation, economic self‑organisation and local democracy. Such a model, which he understands as democratic municipal governance, is what he recommends for both Turkey and Syria. For both countries, he said, this approach is suitable and necessary. It represents a form of local democracy based on the principle of communalism. He added that he thinks about this topic every day.
Within that framework, he said, a dialogue with the Syrian Democratic Forces is also conceivable. He assumes the SDF will listen to him, but he emphasised that no unilateral steps should be taken in this process. Ahmed al‑Sharaa [Syria’s transitional president] must, like the SDF, take concrete positive steps toward a democratic Syria. He said he did not recount the historical developments by accident: Arab nationalism is particularly strong in Syria, but Turkmens also live there and their rights must be protected just like those of the Kurds. The SDF, he said, bear responsibility for all population groups in this regard.
Öcalan also expressed his condolences to the victims of the 6 February 2023 earthquake. He said he intended to dedicate his future work to the memory of those who died in that disaster.
On the subject of Syria, he referred to Feti Yıldız’s remark that the SDF had signed an agreement on 10 March containing eight points that now form the basis of its actions. Hüseyin Yayman stated that there is a widespread perception in Turkish society that Öcalan is de facto the leader of the SDF, and, consequently everyone—both within the commission and among the public—expects concrete steps to be taken on Syria. It is particularly important, he said, to signal an end to violence and enable the mothers from Diyarbakır to have their children returned.
In this context, a committee has already been set up to deal with the return of the children. Yayman emphasised that no one disputes the “historic brotherhood” Öcalan mentioned at the beginning. Political conditions, he said, are now ripe to break through the so‑called coup mechanism. Both President Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, said Yayman, have shown clear will and determination to do so. “This time we can succeed.” Öcalan warned, however, that extreme vigilance is required with regard to this mechanism; if it is reactivated, it could roll over the entire peace process like a bulldozer.
Öcalan explained that his central recommendation for Syria is to establish local democracy. As a positive example, he pointed to the founding phase of the ruling AK Party, which originally focused on municipal governance. The current law on local self‑government, he said, has shortcomings; it needs to be expanded to all cities. He linked this to the ancient Athenian model, in which each region was represented by delegates. That system, he noted, expressed both locality and democracy—two principles that must also be realised in Syria. The order should not be based on ethnicity but should instead take place in a locally strengthened, non‑sectarian democratic framework. He said that the real challenge, however, is to define this concept of local democracy sensibly and to anchor it legally in the Syrian constitution. He stated that a state needs both central unitary powers and regional local democracy, and that one cannot exist without the other. At this point, Feti Yıldız asked whether local democracies in Syria would have their own defensive force. Öcalan said that forces would be present within the scope of Asayish (Internal Security Forces) and that the two forces in Syria needed to be integrated.
Öcalan pointed out that Arab nationalism is deeply rooted in Syria, and the political failings of the Assad family are widely known. If democratic conditions are not created, Öcalan warned, it is not inconceivable that Ahmed al‑Sharaa could also take on dictatorial traits in the future.
Öcalan stated that the Turkmen population in Syria is even more disadvantaged than the Kurds. There is neither a representative organisation nor a “Turkmen commune” to articulate their interests. He questioned whether his interlocutors properly understood the concept of a commune: it is not an ideological term but denotes community and civil society, and this must necessarily exist. Without such a structure, he said, individual interests could prevail: “It is enough for one or two influential families to appear and seize all of Aleppo’s resources.” This, he said, is a danger that affects all ethnic groups equally.
Öcalan said that the Turkmens have made significant contributions in the region for more than a thousand years. They, too, must organise themselves as a civil society—just as the Circassians and Armenians in Syria must integrate into a contemporary civil structure. If Syria is rebuilt without local democracy and a viable civil order, there is a risk of returning to an authoritarian regime like that of Hafez al‑Assad. To prevent this, Öcalan said he is prepared to use all his strength practically.
Öcalan warned that Israel wanted a Syria modelled after its own culture. A complete subordination of Syria to Israeli influence, however, is not an option and poses a serious danger. “I am not saying: let us declare war on Israel,” Öcalan added, “but I promise that I will resolve this matter—including the SDF—wisely, fraternally and cautiously.” This, he added, cannot be done with a mere appeal; it requires intensive relations and sustained dialogue. Without communication, there can be no solution.
Öcalan described the MHP as a force of democratic nationalism and emphasised that it is of great importance to Turkey. He said the political and ideological experiences of this movement should be shared in the spirit of an alliance. He noted that it is necessary to transcend old, conflict‑driven perspectives; the imperative now is collaboration, not confrontation. He called for a way of thinking that transcends party lines and stressed that the notion “I must place the state’s interests above those of my party” should apply not only to the MHP but to all parties. What the commission has brought together, he said, is ultimately state reason—a higher, unifying force. It would have been desirable if the CHP had also taken part in the talks, he added.
Regarding the region, Öcalan called for Turkey‑centred integration extending to Syria and Iraq and, with the necessary political will, potentially including Iran. A significant Azerbaijani population lives in Iran, just as important as the Kurds and they, too, must be part of a democratic integration process, he said. Such a process, he added, could lead to the formation of a Union of Democratic Middle East—a voluntary, democratic cooperation. In that scenario, Turkey as a democratic republic would play a central role while a democratic order of the Middle East could develop. This path does not require hasty action but careful, coordinated cooperation by all involved.
Öcalan emphasised that he is not opposed to preserving a unitary Syrian state. But, he said, Syria should not be rebuilt without local democracy and a functioning civil society. The country must not be sacrificed to a new dictatorship. Asked by Hüseyin Yayman how oil fields and border crossings should be handled in the future, Öcalan replied that a model of fair distribution could be developed. The proposals he makes for Syria could, in the medium term, also be extended to Iran.
He reiterated that his goal is a strong, stable and conflict‑free model of Turkey. The aim, he said, is not just to abandon weapons but also to overcome the ideological and psychological traces of war. In the long term, he said, they want to develop a participatory model that addresses all religions, ethnicities and cultures of the Middle East—a concept based on equality and democratic participation. Just as the past has been marked by negative narratives, a shift to positive, solution‑oriented discourses must now occur. In this sense, the commission has the opportunity to open a historic door, he stated.
He stated that after the dissolution of the PKK and the steps taken to disarm it, further positive steps would be taken, and therefore the law to be enacted by the Commission should be a law specific to the issue, and the legal status of all those associated with the PKK, from the highest to the lowest, should be clarified. Öcalan stated that Bahçeli’s proposal of the “right to hope” should be considered, that this would eliminate the need for a general amnesty, which, he said, was not appropriate for Turkey. He said that the decision was within their authority and therefore the matter should be brought before parliament.
Öcalan said that Iran has at least as much influence over the PKK as Israel does, that he does not share Iran’s ideology. He said that both Israel and Iran would say to him within the context of their state relations, “We were going to declare a state, but Apo prevented it.”
He said he would act as a member of the Republic of Turkey and that he now saw Turkey as his own country, with a democratic society being the ideal solution for the Kurds. He remarked that he wanted Turkey to be a democratic republic and that the AK Party had taken serious steps towards building a democratic republic. He said that he wanted to include Kurdish culture in the republic, that this was a source of richness, and that he did not want it to be interpreted otherwise.
Öcalan noted that there had so far been no detailed legal discussion—this was not primarily the commission’s responsibility. But in order to translate statements into practical policy, he said, free communication is indispensable. He emphasised that Devlet Bahçeli did not choose the term “right to hope” accidentally—without such a right he himself cannot continue to work. If this framework is created, he said, he is prepared to assume responsibility, especially on the Syria question—and, in the event of failure, to accept criticism and legal consequences.
He continued that in his current situation he is unable to confront Israel politically. The consequences he experienced in the past when he stood by Assad demonstrate how strong Israel’s influence against him has been. He assured his interlocutors that he had given his word. He said that the DEM Party was visiting İmralı and Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit could likewise be part of the visiting delegation. When Hüseyin Yayman pointed out that certain politicians were “poisoning” the process through their statements, Öcalan responded that the same applies to certain figures within the PKK. If his working conditions improve, he said, he is confident these problems can be resolved, but it will take time.
Öcalan said he has neither the means nor the freedom to act effectively under present circumstances. Yet as long as he lives, he is convinced that this historic phase can be managed successfully. While his interlocutors speak of a “century without terror,” he prefers to speak of a “century without violence.” He said he has the strength and the political will to contribute at least as much to the solution as his interlocutors.
Öcalan stressed that the current situation can move forward only in the spirit of political alliance and shared responsibility. The fact that members of the commission visited him on İmralı fills him with great hope, he stated, adding that this meeting marks the beginning of an historic phase. He expressed the expectation that his interlocutors could be key figures in making the process a success. Regarding the future course of the dialogue, he said he is generally optimistic.
Feti Yıldız explained on behalf of the delegation that he was present as a representative of the MHP, together with Hüseyin Yayman for the AKP and Gülistan Koçyiğit for the DEM Party, to receive Abdullah Öcalan’s remarks. He noted that the Commission for National Unity, Brotherhood and Solidarity has so far held eighteen official sessions. It has heard a wide variety of social actors: civil society organisations, bar associations, families of fallen soldiers and the “Saturday Mothers” initiative.
Yıldız said it was a broad‑based, pluralistic hearing process. The aim, he said, is to compile the insights gained into a final report containing concrete proposals for a solution. The commission’s work is not yet completed; it is currently in the evaluation and reporting phase, he noted, adding that the present meeting on İmralı is therefore to be understood as the commission’s nineteenth session.
The delegation explained that it could not discuss the political history of Turkey in detail in this setting. However, it is aware of Abdullah Öcalan’s biography as the founder of the organisation as well as the political phases he has gone through. They said they also understood his recent concepts of communal and liberal municipalism. A detailed examination of the organisation’s history is not conducive at this point, the delegation said; what is important is that Öcalan has turned away from armed struggle and taken the political path. He now focuses on topics such as equal citizenship, cultural participation and communalism. The delegation members said they have noted that in February 2025 he issued an official call for all structures to end armed confrontation and dissolve their organisational formations. This has noticeably contributed to easing tensions in society and the public is following this development closely.
The MHP representative emphasised that the demand for disarmament must apply to all relevant structures—not only within Turkey but also in Syria, Iraq and Iran. The existing problems, he said, can be resolved through a democratic process, but only if terror ends completely and a terror‑free Turkey is realised. Feti Yıldız recalled that in October 1999 he had been present in court as the victims’ representative—the lawyer for the families of fallen soldiers. In the 1970s, he stated, the Kurdish movement had hardly been visible within the left. Today, by contrast, the left has largely been absorbed into the Kurdish movement.
Commission members pointed out that while a solution was being discussed on İmralı, voices within the organisation openly opposed it, saying “What solution? What disarmament?” Certain circles, they said, also claimed that Öcalan’s decisions applied only to Turkey and not to other regions. Such objections have been documented.
The commission members recalled that the head of the SDF is widely known as a leader who grew up under Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological guidance—this is public knowledge. In further discussion, they criticised that some party representatives were using terms and rhetoric belonging to the pre‑constitutional era, that is, before the Treaty of Lausanne and the 1924 constitution. This, they said, “poisons” the process and does not contribute to a solution. The withdrawal of PKK units under Sabri Ok aroused indignation in parts of Turkish society because some of the withdrawing fighters remained armed. This raised doubts about how fully the ceasefire and withdrawal proclaimed by Abdullah Öcalan had actually been implemented, they added.
With regard to Syria, commission members said that adherence to the SDF’s integration agreement of 10 March is of central importance. Öcalan should issue a new, clarifying statement on this question, they said and emphasized that this state belongs to all of us. In particular, left‑wing circles must recognise that the understanding of “labour and social organisation” has fundamentally changed, but in some places this awareness has not yet taken hold.
The commission made it clear that Öcalan’s original appeal to renounce weapons was addressed to all components of the PKK and not limited to Turkey. In response, Abdullah Öcalan said that executions were taking place daily in Iran. He wanted to demand of Tehran that democratic rights be granted to Azeris and Kurds and that the death penalty be abolished. This, he said, required political initiative, but he stressed that this should not be understood as a declaration of war. As long as executions in Iran continue, the PJAK will not be prepared to disarm, he noted. Therefore, he said, it is necessary to enter into a dialogue and a ceasefire process with Iran. In the medium term, a model of political integration must be developed that can be presented to Iran, he added.
The commission said there have been reports that PKK forces originally withdrawn from Iraq were instead relocated to Syria. This, they said, contradicts earlier statements about complete disarmament and dissolution. In this context, Hüseyin Yayman said the commission had come to İmralı to ask the questions of the people. All of Turkey is listening to what is said here, and the atmosphere of this meeting can influence the entire region, he noted, describing the meeting as a historic moment for both Turkey and the Middle East.
The People’s Alliance—consisting of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and MHP chairman Devlet Bahçeli—has taken great political risks in this process, Yayman said. All the more, the public expects concrete steps to be taken quickly. “On behalf of the commission and the Republic of Turkey we must succeed,” Yayman stressed. Otherwise, public sentiment could quickly turn negative. He recalled that the public generally reacted positively to Öcalan’s appeal of 27 February, but there is a clear desire for tangible measures. The delegation, he said, had also come with full consideration for the sensitivity of families of fallen soldiers.
Yayman said he himself had served on the previous “Council of Wise People” and received massive public criticism for it. Nevertheless, he said, there is an obligation to succeed. The outcome of this meeting will directly determine whether the peace process continues or takes an entirely different turn, he warned. In the context of this historic phase, both the work of the Grand National Assembly’s commission and this conversation on İmralı gain particularly deep significance, he added.
It was pointed out that everyone who has closely followed previous talks between the state and the organisation knows that in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2009 and 2014 there was each time a genuine chance to change the course of history. It was stressed that Öcalan’s 27 February call has rekindled hope in this sense, and practical steps must quickly follow now. Expectations of the commission are accordingly high, and mistakes of the past must not be repeated, and there is an invisible hand and a coup mechanism that have intervened repeatedly in the past. The only way to escape this cycle is for the organisation—in Syria, Turkey and elsewhere—to heed Abdullah Öcalan’s call, he stressed.
It was underlined that collective historical memory can either help to strengthen the thousand‑year brotherhood between Turks and Kurds or, conversely, lead to an even deeper crisis, destruction or armed conflict. Feti Yıldız emphasised that formulating unrealistic scenarios for Turkey is detrimental to a solution and can sabotage the entire process; prudence is therefore required. At the same time, it was pointed out that the latent danger of a coup still exists and must be openly named and clarified.
It was stressed that the fundamental challenge is that, if a “terror-free Turkey” is to become reality, the republic now expects concrete, practical steps, which must be based on historical experience and a sharpened awareness of collective memory. Abdullah Öcalan reaffirmed that he is working towards positive steps and constructive developments. It was noted that tveryone who has appeared before the commission has emphasised that rapid and concrete measures are necessary. There is resistance because relocating the movement’s organisational centre from Qandil to Syria will not resolve the underlying problem. It was emphasised that as leader of the organisation, Abdullah Öcalan must issue a clear and binding instruction, and the entire public and the Republic of Turkey expect this from him.
The commission said that such a step could create a new social atmosphere. Almost all groups that have spoken before the commission have declared that if violence is permanently renounced, Turkey will make enormous progress. This underlines how much now depends on concrete measures. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that if the process stalls, the coup mechanism could once again be activated. It is the commission’s task to overcome historical contradictions and pave a new path for the future.
Abdullah Öcalan stated that he himself comes from a Turkmen and idealistic‑nationalist tradition and has taken the initiative out of the spirit of brotherhood. The establishment of the commission itself is a historic step, and the delegation has come with a qualified majority, he noted. The commission said the public is now asking: “What is the result? Will there be disarmament in Syria? Will the mothers of Diyarbakır get their children back? Will violence be relinquished not only outwardly but also in thought?” These questions await answers.
Upon leaving the island, the delegation will be questioned by the press and will make a statement. The central problem, as the head of the MHP’s organisational department put it, is the “pedal problem”: if everyone does not push in the same direction at the same time, the process cannot move forward. The public knows that deeply rooted problems cannot be resolved in a single day. All the more important now is to set out a roadmap, send positive signals and build social expectations. Political psychology in Turkey is ready for this step, and it is the task of all involved to use this momentum. This historic step must be reinforced by an historic result; otherwise, no progress will be made. Öcalan was cautiously optimistic but emphasised that he has not forgotten the mistakes and experiences of the past and that he continues to work towards making a Turkey without terror possible.
Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit said that Abdullah Öcalan appeared healthy and in good condition. She said that within the scope of the commission’s work many social groups have already been heard; today, on behalf of the commission, they are on İmralı and want to listen to his perspectives and make them accessible to the public. She emphasised that it is important how Kurdish society organises itself independently and integrates into the republic, and what character the republic will in turn redefine itself as. The question arises: what kind of republic will that be?
Koçyiğit said they were interested to know what Öcalan believed was necessary for the process to advance and for his position to be strengthened, in particular what concrete role the commission should play in putting his ideas and proposals into practice. In conclusion, she pointed out that the following day, 25 November, was the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and she passed on greetings and messages of solidarity from women’s movements.