1.4 Capitalism’s Relationship With Political Power and Law

The nucleus of capitalism was formed in the seedbed of political power and law. Capitalism benefits from all forms of power and their legal systems. When it suits its purpose, capitalism is the most ardent advocate of such power and legal systems; but, when Its profits are under threat, it will overthrow that particular system without hesitation, using various types of conspiracies.13 It even at times takes part in the boldest revolutionary games. It wages power struggles –especially during times of crisis and chaos– using both fascist coup d’états and bogus state communist coup d’états. 14 Indeed, it has waged the most extensive of all colonial and imperial wars.

I must emphasize that capitalism’s need for the armor of power has hover been equaled by that of any other economic form. Capitalism could not have come into existence without this armor. The principal assumption of the political-economy “scientists” is that profit, surplus product and value were formed outside power relations for the first lime in history. They claim that this was achieved through economical methods such as the voluntary union of capital and labor. According to them, this is indeed capitalism’s key characteristic. In fact, what we face here is a rhetoric as distorted as the labor theory.

Let us look at the picture they paint us: Capital was peacefully formed somewhere or other. As a result of peaceful relations, villagers, “flits, and craftsman came together, left their production tools behind and put together the new economic form right there and then – almost like u happy revolutionary marriage. This is how the story is more or lean told, through the formation of a synthesis they have come up with a new economic form. In all their texts, the giants of political economy– whether left or right-have almost given this idea the status of a creed. Without it, there would be no political economy. Add competition in the market place to this credo and you have the fundamental principles of political economy-a perfect book.

I don’t see the need to make any claims myself. The research by the sociologist and historian Fernand Braudel, published as Civilization and Capitalism (on which he worked for 30 years, producing a magnificent, three-volume monument), explicitly refutes this claim through extensive observations and by using a comparative approach. His first conclusion is that capitalism is anti-market. Secondly, that capitalism is completely in league with power and ruling. Thirdly, that capitalism has been monopolist since the beginning, before the establishment of industry, and it is still monopolist. Fourthly, it did not come about u a result of competition from below and within but rather externally and from the top through plunder and monopolistic practice. This is the main substance of his book. There are some aspects that I disagree with or that I find insufficient. But in general, and in its essence, it is the most valuable historical and sociological interpretation that I have seen. It is a good start to correcting the damage and distortions (done to social sciences) of the English political economists, French socialists, and German historians and philosophers.

Thus, there is no economic order formed between capitalist worker through a union of their strength and labor accumulation in voluntary and free competitive environment. No other tale is so far off mark. None of the elements and economic power which we can regard as belonging to the capitalist class can survive without the protection political power; indeed, without this protection the capitalists cannot maintain their rule. Moreover, without an extensive siege of the politic power, there can be no market for the exchange of goods and through free competition in any of the city markets. Most importantly, without brutal and unfair coercion, it would not be possible to separate the serf, peasant, and urban craftsman from his land or workbench. In Europe, the land and plant workers rebelled against such coercion from the 14th to the 19th centuries. 15 Thousands were executed, millions killed, in civil wars, and many more withered away in prisons and hospitals.

But this was not enough: religious and national wars, along with colonialist and imperialist wars, immersed the world in blood. The relationship between such coercion and the monopolistic and plundering character of capitalism can be clearly seen at its inception. No rhetoric by political economy can reverse this reality.

To illustrate this more concretely, we should have a closer look at the sixteenth century wars that carried the capitalists to victory. The emperors of the Habsburg dynasty’s Spanish branch, the kings of the Valois dynasty in France, the Anglo-Saxon Stuarts’ that usurped England’s Norman kings, and, more interestingly, the House of Orange-Nassau, the heirs to the crown of the Netherlands (who have never been mentioned in this regard before), were to be the century’s principal contributors to power and war.

The Habsburg kings and emperors were encouraged as the Muslims were driven from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century; they then rapidly moved towards empire. They saw themselves as the heirs of Rome. This was particularly due to the fall of Constantinople at the hands of the Otoman dynasty in 1453 and the fact that the Austrian Habsburgs led the war against the Ottomans. The French Valois dynasty too desired an empire. They too saw themselves as the true heirs of Rome. Both the English Kingdom and the Netherlands’ House of Orange waged proto-national liberation struggles to prevent being engulfed by these two empires. The Kingdom of Sweden, the Prussian Princedom, and even Muscovy’s Tsardom followed a similar course. If the Habsburgs and the Valois had succeeded in engulfing the English Kingdom and the Orange Princedom at the onset of sixteenth century, then it is highly probable that the capitalist development that occurred in the cities of Northwest Europe (and especially in England and the Netherlands) would have shared the fate of the Italian cities of Venice, Genoa, and Florence.

The fundamental reason why these very strong, capitalist Italian cities were not able to declare the victory of capitalism all over Italy was because they were politically weak. Or rather, the hegemonic wars and conquests that the Spanish, French, and Austrian kings and empires waged against the Italian cities (and thus on their wealth) resulted in the surrender of these cities. They had to be content with restricted economic and political power. Therefore, not only was the union of Italy delayed until the nineteenth century, but capitalism’s Italian experiment was half-baked and not able to spread across the country. Albeit temporarily, coercion played a decisive role. But (and as any capitalistic agency would do) the Italian urban capitalists enchained these states (that is, the Spanish, French and Austrian) by financial means in return for abandoning any claim they may have had to sovereignty: not hesitating to become an instrument of give and take policies. This is because capitalism –as a new religion– was being constructed around money.

There were two reasons why the Kingdom of England and the Principality of Orange were able to stay the imperial states. One was the fact that the capitalists gave credit to the English and Dutch states; the other that they constructed the maritime transport industry in cooperation with these states. (In fact. England and the Netherlands concentrated their efforts on naval forces instead of land forces.)

At the time, there were two strategic developments. First: The English Kingdom and the Principality of the Netherlands focused on a state model that reorganized itself and operated in capitalist way. They were the first states to nurture themselves with regular taxes, balance the budgets, to have rational bureaucracy, and to protect themselves with professional armies. Moreover, they defeated the naval forces of Spain and France with their superior naval forces. Their success in the Atlantic Ocean and their later hegemony in the Mediterranean determined the outcome of the colonial wars. This was the beginning of the end of the Spanish and French kingdoms. (The success that the Spanish and French kings had with their land forces cost so much that it turned into a Pyrrhic victory.) The improvements in the power structures of England and the Netherlands thus were decisive for the fate of the capitalist economy. It is once again observable that at a very critical moment political force can play a decisive role in the formation of an economic form. And so, where the Italian cities failed, London and Amsterdam succeeded.

Second: In the imperial states of Spain, France, and Austria a development different to the one in England and the Netherlands took place in the sixteenth century. These three states, who shared bonds of kinship but also severe mutual conflict, wanted to establish empires similar to that of Rome. The English Kingdom had abandoned such a desire earlier on. Instead of just a European empire, it had set its eyes on becoming a world empire. But despite the many reforms aimed at turning the Spanish, French, and Austrian state regimes into modern monarchies, they were still at heart political instruments shaped according to the old societal systems. They were far from creating a modern taxation system, bureaucracy and a professional army. They had budget deficits and as a result were constantly in debt. They were unable to resolve the perturbations caused by capitalist development. In contrast to England and the Netherlands, they had no support from the capitalists; instead, there were major internal conflicts due to debts and tax farming. The imperial states had more problems than England with the feudal aristocracy on issues such as centralization and advancement towards a monarchic kingdom. Due to the urban and rural conflicts, society as a whole ms in a state of unrest –these rebellions alone would have been enough to lutlneste the monarchies. The clandestine support England and the Netherlands gave the opponents of the imperial states led to the outbreak of many revolutions. (Of course, the results of a revolution may differ greatly from tttts’s objectives with starting it, just as it was with the French Revolution.)

The very same powers that prevented the political and social victory of the capitalist economy in Italy –the French, Spanish, and Austrian monarchies– could not escape repeated defeats inflicted by the productive state models financed by England’s and the Netherlands’ urban capitalists. Once again, we can very clearly see the relationship between economic form and coercive systems; we also see that their relationship was decisive in the birth of strategic outcomes. Sixteenth century Europe is the perfect laboratory for observing the relationship between coercion, power, and economy. It is as if the entire civilizational history has awakened to tell its own story: “The better you understand sixteenth century Europe, the better you will understand me!” A short summary of the historic and social development of the relationship between coercion and economy may clarify the issue at hand.

In the pre-civilization period, the “strong man” of the clan used the organized forces that existed for hunting to obtain control over the initial economy of society.

in the social epochs preceding civilization, the initial organized force of the “strong man” did not only trap animals. It was this organized force, yet again, that coveted the family-clan unit that the woman had established as a product of her emotional labor. The take-over of the family-clan constituted the first serious organization of force. What were usurped in the process was woman herself, her children and kin, and all their material and moral cultural accumulation. It was the plunder of the initial economy, the home economy. The organized force of proto-priest (shaman), the hakim sheikh (experienced, wise elder), and the strong man (with his organized force) allied to compose the initial and long-term patriarchal hierarchic power, that of holy governance. This can be seen in all societies that are at a similar stage: until the class, city, and state stage, this hierarchy is dominant in social and economic life.

The economic formation of the civilizational period that began with the establishment of class-city-state-the power center personified with the priest, king, and commander define the state.

The institutions of religion, politics, and military forces are all interlinked, thus forming power itself. The main characteristic of this power system is that it organizes its own economy as state communism. This economy is what I call (at the time I hadn’t yet seen Max Weber use the term) Pharaoh socialism. Pharaoh socialism worked the people like simple slaves: their reward a bowl of soup in order to keep them alive (as be seen from the thousands of slave bowls found in the remnants of old temples and palaces). Remnants of the matriarchal economy continued to exist within the patriarchal, feudal, and tribal economy.

Force, when institutionalized as the state, sees economic plunder as its right wherever it goes. Plunder, in a way, is thought to be the right of the one that uses force. Force is divine and sacred; everything it does is, righteous and legitimate. This was especially so in the main centers of civilization (such as the ones in Middle East, China, and India) where the political superstructure or highest caste saw infrastructure as part of the economy and believed they had the power to administer them however they liked. At the time, neither market nor competition had yet developed, nor had the concept of economic sector as it exists today. However, trade did exist and was seen as one of the main functions between states. Trade was far from being privatized: state monopoly was at the same time a trade monopoly. Some market towns were established at the periphery of states; some even turned into city states. Trade was done by caravan, which meant that robbery by the strong man of the area (and much later by pirates, bandits, and the robber barons-the “forty thieves” of Scheherazade’s story) was as bad as the state robbery.

Their cultural inheritance from the violent Babylonian and Assyrian empires saw to it that autonomous towns, markets, and trade became widespread and extensive in Greco-Roman civilization.

The despotic Babylonian and Assyrian states (themselves the heirs of Uruk and Ur) made a new contribution to civilization and economy by introducing trade agents, who were in fact the embodiment of the concepts markets. trading colonies. and profit. There had already been trade colonies in the Uruk era and even earlier; increased exchange at the end of the era and the formation of the market prepared the ground for the rise of the Assyrian state as the first “magnificent” empire in history. Empires were a response to the need for economic security. In Assyria, the backbone of the economy was trade. This trade and trading colonies required a political organization in the form of an empire. History sees the Assyrian Empire as the most brutal example of empire and despotism. Here, once again, the but; is the trade monopoly –yet a draft of capitalism. The Assyrian trade and monopolist capitalism brought with it the most brutal regime.

By adding the urban trade-colonies of the Phoenicians to their Assyrian inheritance, the Greco-Roman political power was able to create an economic infrastructure with a more advanced political superstructure. Exchange had by now become widespread, and autonomous cities, markets, trade, and competition (although limited) came into play. Urbanization started to balance the role of the rural areas. The rural areas now produced more surplus product for the cities so that it could be exchanged. Textiles, fund, and metal trade developed. Road networks were built from China to the Atlantic Ocean. As a result of the trade between East and West, the political power in Iran was transformed into a permanent merchant empire. This put so much pressure on the Greeks and Romans that Iran became hegemonic. They were also the main obstacle preventing the Chinese, Indian, and Central Asians from fulfilling their desire to occupy the West. At the same time, the Iranian Empire was the obstacle that prevented the West from fulfilling their desire to occupy the East. Alexander and the Diadochi were the first to destroy this obstacle and occupy enormous parts of the East, but only for a short time (330-250 BCE).16

The early examples of capitalist economy are seen most clearly in the Greco-Roman civilization. That these powers were on the verge of t capitalism is clear from the degree of autonomy of the towns, the fact that exchange and determining of price took place at the market, and the existence of big merchants. Capitalism was not yet the dominant social system, as the rural areas were still stronger than the towns. The existence of the empires (that relied predominately on a rural economy) did not allow capitalism to become the dominant social system. The capitalists’ ability to intervene in production and industry was very limited and were subject to strict intervention from the political powers. They mainly remained at the level of large-scale merchants. At the time, the status of the slave was still one of devotion to the master and there was little chance of a free labor force. Women were sold and bought as concubines and men as slaves. The determining factor in a slave economy is violence, the existence of slaves as an economic value alone clearly shows relationship between violence and economy, that is, an economy based on seizure of surplus-product. Since their formation and the start of their capitalist exploitation, the political and military castes of the Chinese and Indian systems of Antiquity believed their main duty was to rule the entire society. They viewed the rest of society as a subservient, economic sector and saw it as their divine right to make them work.

As explained earlier, the term economy originated in the Greek world. Its original meaning of “family management” points to the connection between economy and women. But it also points to the role of traditional political power that, as political monopoly, played the same role in the economy as the monopolies in the age of capitalism. I must underline that there is a strict correlation between political monopoly and economic monopoly and, in general, one requires the other. The political powers of Athens and Rome were so huge that, paradoxically, it shut its doors to capitalism. On the other hand, urban power was so small relative to that of the rural areas, that neither Athens nor Rome could command a city- based economy. Nevertheless, in this period of civilization, capitalism was introduced into the system, even though it was not yet ready for wholesale, systemic capitalist development.

Trade and the sword played a fundamental part in the rise of Islam, thereby determining values that found their way to Europe.

In medieval Islamic civilization, trade had reached a point where it played an influential role. Economically, the Prophet Muhammad and Islam were closely connected to trade. 17 Sandwiched between the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires, an Arab aristocracy had developed, founded on trade.18 This became the main social and economic factor in the rise of Islam. From its birth, Islam has predicated itself on the strength of the word. The Jews’ and Syriacs’ (remnants of the Assyrians) domination of trade and money clearly was one reason for the conflict between them and Muhammad’s followers. In fact, they as the two political monopolies did not give the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires much room to act. Again, this situation at such a turning point in history and in this ancient location clearly shows the relationship between coercion and economy.

The Middle Ages were, in a way, an Islamic era. For trade to forge thead security was needed and thus empire was needed. But exactly because of the need for security, trade was continuously obstructed and the transformation of trade capital into capitalistic production motde continuously prevented. The social fabric of the rural areas was under the scrutiny of religion and morals, and the limited freedom this capital gained in the towns could not be transformed into political power. Although there was an extensive network of towns and markets, and the towns had grown considerably, they were not strong enough to surpass the status of the Italian cities. The problem was definitely not one of technology. It was due to religious and political monopolists. It is in accordance with Islam’s religious-political system that the merchant was often subjected to confiscation of his goods.

The fact that Islam has not given way to capitalism is a positive aspect of Islam. It still is the most serious obstacle to capitalism through its conception of ummah and internationalism of peoples, its opposition to interest, its assistance to the poor, etc. If these are interpreted positively, they may be important contributions to projects for social freedom. However, it should he noted that the present day Islamic radicalism carries with it a right wing and economic nationalism full of nee-Islamic capitalism.

It was the Arabs and Berbers under leadership of the Andalusian Umayyads who carried the Islamic civilization culturally to Europe. It was the Italian city merchants who carried it economically, through trade. The Ottomans only carried it through political monopolies, their only influence on impetus to the growth of capitalism when the European political and religious forces utilized this system in order to keep standing against the Ottoman onslaught. Had the Ottomans not existed, it just may be that the religious and political monopolies of Europe would not have been forced to organize themselves economically, politically, and militarily according to the capitalistic method. One can see yet again that power results in power and that it accelerates the search for modes of economy.

As Max Weber demonstrated in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the decisive contribution of the Middle East to the birth of capitalism in Europe is related to Christianity. I hope to go into more detail in my next book. By the tenth century its role of determining the ethics of Europe was completed; thus, the Middle East played a fundamental role in the birth of feudal Europe (both politically and religiously). Then the Middle East once again was channeled to Europe via the Crusader wars.

When this brief summary of the historic and social developments is viewed together with my evaluation of the sixteenth century, the century that birthed the capitalist system, our understanding of Middle East’s influence on the birth of political power and capitalism will be enhanced –at times it inhibited and prevented, at times it accelerated and even fertilized. The dictum that state monopoly equals capitalist monopoly is demonstrated most clearly in the capitalist system. I will now briefly touch on a few aspects regarding the relationship between law and the new system.

Law as an institution imposes itself on a society as trade, market, and town relations develop. Societies where law comes into play are societies where morals are worn out, where the role force plays has increased and caused chaos, and where inequality is distinctly experienced. The problems concerning morality and inequality arise around the class divisions and markets of the cities. Thus, for states law becomes inevitable. Although it is possible to govern the state without law, it certainly is very difficult.

Law can be defined as the act of the state’s political power becoming permanent, orderly, and institutionalized –in a way it is a state which has attained calmness and steadiness. No other institution has such close ties to the state as law. The relationship between trade and state has become increasingly complex and sophisticated, from the beginning to date-the phase of capitalism. Codes of law were drawn up in many states, from Ur to Babylon to Rome.19 These codes mostly dealt with security of property and prevention of the loss of life. Usually, law tries to relieve problems caused by politics, but there are times when it aggravates these problems.

The role of law, contrary to general belief, is not to ensure equal treatment of all citizens but to legitimize the existent inequalities, to keep these at an acceptable level. and to render political power untouchable. In short, viewing law as the permanent regulation of political power monopoly is closer to the truth.

The relationship between law and morals is of great importance. Morals are the cement of a society. There is no society without morals. Morals are the initial organizational principle of human society; their true function to regulate the ordering and shaping of analytical and emotional intelligence into a code of principles and conduct for the good of society, a code that sees the entire society as equal, but protects the role of and right to diversity. At first, morals represented the collective conscience of society. However, moral society suffered its first blow with the institutionalization of political power and hierarchy in the form of the state when class division brought moral division.

This was the start of the morality problem. Whereas the political elite sought legal solutions to this problem, the priests responded to the morality problem through methods of religion-both law and religion claiming morality as their source. In the same way that the permanent, orderly and institutionalized mechanisms of political power constitute law and attempt to solve their problems through legal methods, the constructors of religion attempt to resolve the moral crisis with religion. The difference between them is that law has the power of implementation, whereas religion relies on the fear of god and conscience.

Because morality pertains to the human’s ability to choose, it is loosely connected with freedom. Morality entails freedom, society shows tin level of freedom through its morals. Hence, if there is no freedom, there are no morals. The best way to bring a society down is to cut its ties with its morals. Weakening of religious influence will not lead to such a collapse. The vacuum thus created can be filled with various ideologies and political philosophies and economic lifestyles (which themselves have almost become religion). However, the vacuum left by the dissolution of morals can only be filled by being doomed, and by deprivation of freedom. It is thus of grave importance to formulate the true function of morals. It is the duty of ethics, as the theory of morals, to examine the existence of morals as a fundamental philosophical question and to restore its principal role. But its true role must be laid bare. Until morality becomes the fundamental principle of life, this will continue to be a problem of undiminishing importance within the society.

Understanding the relationship between political power, law, and morals is important for our discussion of the birth of the capitalist economy. In a society where religion and morals (or even feudal law) are not sporadically disrupted, where they are not worn out, it will be impossible for a capitalist economy to secure a place for itself. I am not advocating the approach of the former upper classes to that of religion and morals; I am saying that the ethics of major religions and major traditions and teachings of morality will find a system such as capitalism extremely difficult to be compatible with their own principles. Furthermore, whereas the influence of political power on moral and religious issues is limited, the downfall of religion and morals signals the end of a political power. Discussions of reformation, law, and moral philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are, clearly, closely related to the birth of capitalism.

The Protestant Reformation and the ensuing debates and wars were the main determinants of the fate of modern age Europe. In his evaluation of the role of Protestant morals, Max Weber neglected a very important point: Protestantism eased the birth of capitalism but has dealt a huge blow in general to religion and morals, especially Catholicism. Protestantism is thus also quite responsible for all the sins of capitalism. I am not defending religion and Catholicism, but I maintain that Protestantism has left society more defenseless. Wherever Protestantism took root, capitalism thrived. In a way, it has acted as Trojan Horse for capitalism.

There were philosophers that gave early warning against the problems that resulted from Protestant reformation and the new Leviathan it has created. It would be more realistic to call Friedrich Nietzsche the spearhead of taking a stance against capitalist modernity. Even today these philosophers are important for their anti-capitalist stance and their quest for a free society and a free individual.

The discussions and re-theorizing of law by jurist-philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes of England (1588-1679) and Grotius (Hugo de Groot) from the Netherlands (1583-1645) helped to pave the way for the new Leviathan, the capitalist state. 20 By handing the monopoly of violence to the state, society was disarmed.21 The end result was the centralized nation-state that culminated in fascism, a form of state that has centralized power on a scale unknown in any other time in history. The theory of the indivisibility of sovereign rule entails that all the social forces apart from state are left with no power, leaving society destitute and without its tools of self defense against the capitalist monster. In short, these two philosophers declared man’s inhumanity to man and presented the good news, namely that the monarch’s monopolist power was absolute. This paved the way in the capitalist monopoly. If I may repeat: political monopoly equals economic monopoly. The Florentine philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) openly declared, without hiding behind any disguise, that for political success, when the need arises, no moral rule should be adhered to, thus uttering the principle required for fascism centuries earlier.

I do not wish to be misunderstood: I do not reject or criticize all the vilorts of reformation. In my opinion, religious reformation should not happen once but as often as possible. For many years now, I have been saying that an Islamic reformation, one more profound and ongoing than that of Christianity is a necessity. Clearly, such action requires capacity and personality. But if we are to transcend Middle Eastern despotism, it is unavoidable. I plan to discuss this and related subjects in a separate work.

I will not discuss the Renaissance and Enlightenment here. Of course, it is not proper to generalize and I need to say this clearly: As much as there we re those who deliberately opened the way for capitalism, there were those who tried to block it. It is understandable that capitalist elements wished to assimilate their opponents (by relying on the power of their money) as much as the political power wished to tie their opponents down. But, of course, there were the great freedom philosophers who wished to serve humanity even at the risk of being burnt: reformers like Giordano Bruno and Erasmus, as well as utopists and proponents of communes.22

I want to stress that during the ages of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment all civilizations came alive; they all were revived. They expressed, pictured, and turned themselves into melodies. They became both divine and subject. They fought and made peace. They won and were beaten. However, in the end, the capitalist elements that had been lying in ambush in the marginal corners and crevices of society for countless centuries crowned their system with glory by exploiting and assimilating the zeitgeist through the use of violence, money, and material power, for they were the best prepared organizational and material power at the time. And their system is still continuing its victorious march.

Notes

13. An example of this is the 1953 coup in Iran, orchestrated by the USA and Britain.

14. Examples of the former is the 1976 coup in Argentine; an example of the latter is the slaughter in 1965 –of up to a million alleged communist sympathizers– carried out by General Suharto, who ousted Megawati’s father, President Sukarno, to become Indonesia’s military dictator. What is less well known is that the British and American governments did not just cover up the massacre; they had a direct hand in bringing it about. Even less widely known is that the supposed pro-communist coup that triggered the crisis was almost certainly also the work of the CIA.

15. The 1323-1328 Peasant revolt in Flanders, the 1378 Revolt of the Ciompi by the Florentine textile workers, the 1381 Peasant’s revolt in England, and the 1524 Stiihlingen Peasants’ rebellion are but a few examples of such uprisings that were brutally repressed.

16. The Diadochi were the direct successors to Alexander the Great: The dynasties of Antigonus, Lysimachus, Cassander, Ptolemy, and Seleucus divided the territories conquered by Alexander into Hellenistic empires.

17. See Asghar Ali Engineer for an insightful analysis of the role of trade and commerce in the birth and expansion of Islam. Asghar Ali Engineer, “Origin and Development of Islam,” Social Scientist, 3:9 (April 1975), 22-44.

18. “If we are to look for an economic change correlated with the origin of Islam, then it is here that we must look,’ ‘ states Montgomery Watt: “In the rise of Mecca to wealth and power we have a movement from nomadic economy to a mercantile and capitalist economy.” Montgomery Watt, Mohammad at Mecca (London, Oxford University Press, 1953).

19. The Code of Ur-Nammu, ca. 2050 BC, the Code of Hammurabi, ca. 1790 BC and the Law of the Twelve Tables, 451 BC.

20. In his 1609 treatise Mare Liberum (“The free sea”), Grotius argued that the sea was international territory and thus all nations were free to use it for maritime trade, thus providing ideological justification for the Dutch to use their naval power to break up the Portuguese trade monopoly in the East-and then to establish their own.

21. Following in the vein of the French jurist-philosopher lean Bodin (1530-1596), Hobbes argued in his Leviathan (1651) that the sovereign should have all civil, military, judicial, and ecclesiastical powers.

22. Like Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Charles Fourier.