THREE – Some Problems of Methodology

Some Problems of Methodology

Methodology, the shortest path to the target, is not a Western concept. It has been an aspect of the schools of wisdom in the Middle East since ancient times. The most suitable ways of accessing knowledge have always been tested, and those that have achieved the best results became fundamental methods. Usually schools of thought develop a logic and a methodology based on the concepts that they focus on most closely. When the hegemonic center of the world civilization system shifted to Europe, developments in many areas that would ensure superiority, for example, methodology in the scientific field, also emerged. The appearance of Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Galileo Galilei in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with each introducing significant methodological approaches, is closely linked to the shift of the hegemonic system to Europe.

The development of the subject-object distinction, one of the most important concepts of scientific method, is linked to the domination of nature. When the capitalist monopolies, the new accumulation instruments of capital and power, started to exploit physical and biological resources and the resources that belonged to social nature, they quickly understood how advantageous these could be for accumulation. Objectification of resources that belonged to both of these natures made ever-increasing contributions to capital and power accumulation. The intellectual counterpart to this material development is the separation into subject and object. While this was reflected as the distinction between the subjective and the objective in Bacon, it took the form of a sharp mind/body distinction in Descartes. In Galileo, mathematics appears as the language of nature and the most advanced criterion of the object. Following history’s long Mesopotamian journey, a development similar to that experienced in ancient Greece repeats itself with unique differences in West Europe. In fact, Sumerian society had also carried the life experiences of Upper Mesopotamia, filtered through thousands of years, into Lower Mesopotamia, which then added its own distinct qualities to create an original form.

In the central civilization systems, the subject always stems from capital and power. It represents consciousness, discourse, and free will. At times, it is an individual, and, at other times, it is the institution, but it always exists. The objects are the barbarians, the peoples, and the women excluded from power. They are only thought of—as is the case with nature—when they serve the subject as a resource. Given the nature of things, no other meaning is imaginable for them. In Sumerian mythology, the creation story of the human being as a servant from the excrement of the gods and of the woman from the man’s rib reflect the dimensions of objectification in the depths of history. The transfer of this subject-object approach to European thought required significant transformations. But it cannot be denied that the development unfolded in this way.

At present, the subject-object distinction has faded, due to the rise to prominence of the financial capital system. The symbolic hegemony of financial capital in the central civilization system has dissolved all the former subject-object states. The fact that everyone positions themselves as subjects sometimes and objects at other times, as appropriate, is closely linked to these new forms of capital and power accumulation. The capital and power apparatuses that originate from the snowballing reproduction of nationalism, religionism, sexism, and scientism, both in the real and virtual dimensions, have wrapped themselves around the society like an octopus. Under these conditions each individual and institution can duly end up in the position of a subject or an object. When the role of gods in Sumerian society was taken over by the ideological apparatuses, the transformation of the subject-object distinction was inevitable. At the same time, the new symbolic characteristics of the gods and their dominion obviously rendered the existing distinction superfluous.

The gradual fragmentation of knowledge and the loss of sacredness in the course of the history of the central civilization unfolded in a similar way. We can clearly observe in history that the reproduction of capital and power apparatuses caused an equivalent fragmentation of knowledge. In all clan and tribal societies, science is a whole, and its representatives are considered sacred. Divinity is attributed to science, and it is assigned to all according to their desire and effort. While this was the overall approach in mythology, in religion and philosophy it was the principle approach. The original fragmenting was mainly seen in the natural sciences and knowledge structures of Western Europe. The new organizations of knowledge (academies and universities) increasingly detached themselves from society, and serving the interests of the capital and power elites found themselves in the ranks of the favored institutions of the new state (Leviathan). The process of turning science into capital and merging it with power was, at the same time, the alienation of science from the society. The headquarters and temples of science that resolves problems were turned into centers for creating problems, effectuating alienation, and ensuring ideological hegemony. A scientific discipline developed for every natural and social resource. This reality alone proves the interdependence of science with capital and power. The field of science, which is sacred to society as a whole, has drifted as far away as possible from serving society. Scientific disciplines have become paid professions and have even become capital itself. They have become highly dangerous accomplices of power. We know very well that the production of nuclear weapons and many other deadly weapons, as well as all the processes that risk environmental destruction, have their origins in scientific centers. Those who work in these centers are not concerned with the truth (society’s collective conscience) but have chosen to act as mentors facilitating the production of capital and power as efficiently as possible.

The first question that comes to mind when you talk about scientific work today is: How much money will it bring in? Society, however, expects science to respond to its fundamental concerns. Society, with its material and immaterial concerns, has considered science as a whole to be a divine profession and has, as a result, accepted it. The degeneration of the academy and the university is another cause of the crisis in science. The history of knowledge underwent a transformation related to the history of civilization and could not escape its share of the system’s general crisis. Although intended as a tool for solving problems, science has become the key source of problems. The result is the fragmentation of science, its disintegration, and chaos.

A good grasp of different natures—in other words, the question of first, second, and third natures—is necessary. All nature, excluding human society, is distinguished as first nature. The concept of first nature is contradictory in itself. First of all, there are an infinite variety of distinctions, such as animate-inanimate, plants-animals, even physics-chemistry, and, if we take another step, visible-invisible matter and energy-matter become conceivable. Moreover, we can delineate a society for each distinction. When we look closer at ways of approaching the question of natures, we find that they are profoundly influenced by the subject-object distinction. It should be emphasized that these are not sound distinctions, or at least should only be made conditionally.

Human society, as second nature, no doubt represents a very important stage of natural development and has certain particularities. Rather than as a separate nature, it makes more sense to see it as a different stage of nature.

The most important distinguishing characteristic of social nature is the extent of its intellectual capacity, flexibility, and ability to construct itself. First nature no doubt also has intellectual capacity, flexibility, and the ability to construct itself, but compared to the functioning of the social nature, it is very slow, rigid, and arduous. It seems very important to me that the nature of society be theorized as a whole. Although this was the priority for early sociologists, over the course of time the analysis of parts and structures increasingly came to the fore: just as we have observed in the analyses of other natures. Furthermore, distinguishing between the base and the superstructure of society, partitioning it into economy, politics, and power, dividing it into strata and stages, such as primeval communal society, slave-owning society, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism or communism, can only produce meaningful results if we are extremely conscious of diversity. No analysis of a stratum, part, or structure can replace a holistic theoretical approach. We could say that no philosopher or sociologist has been able to surpass the holistic approach of Plato and Aristotle. Even the holistic interpretations of the sages and prophets with their roots in the Middle East, or the East more generally, are more instructive and socially useful than those of the philosophers and sociologists of capitalist modernity. These interpretations are valuable, because they represent a more progressive and sophisticated approach. We must particularly emphasize that the most important role in rendering the holistic theoretical approach ineffective is played by the apparatuses of capital and power accumulation.

There is an urgent need for a new methodology, a profound theoretical approach, that can be used to examine human society. In particular, we must understand that sociological methods—overwhelmed by the hustle of numbers—conceal the truth instead of revealing it. It should not be seen as exaggeration when I say that existing sociology conceals the truth more than mythologies ever did. Moreover, the meaning reached on the basis of sensing the truth in mythologies is more humane and closer to truth than that reached by the sociologies of capitalist modernity.

The social sciences are without a doubt important, however, it is difficult to call them sciences in their present state. The existing sociological discourse hardly expresses any meaning beyond the legitimization of official modernity. Therefore, there is a need for a radical scientific revolution and a methodological egress.

The stage called third nature, which we want to make sense of, is only possible because of this scientific and methodological revolution. Third nature, as a concept, refers to a state of restored harmony between first and second nature at a higher level. Achieving a synthesis of social nature with first nature at a higher level requires a revolutionary theoretical paradigm and a radical practical revolution. In particular, surpassing the capitalist world system, or capitalist modernity—the current stage of the central civilization system—would be a decisive achievement. To this end, albeit minimally, we must develop constructs of democratic civilization, take successful steps in developing the ecological and feminist characteristics of society, creating a functional art of democratic politics, and building a democratic civil society.

Third nature is not a promise of a new paradise or utopia; it is the renewed participation of human beings—whose consciousness of the natures has increased—in a grand harmony, while protecting their difference. This is not just a longing, an intention, and the promise of utopia but, rather, the art of good and beautiful living that has a contemporary practical meaning. I am not talking about biologism here; I am aware of the danger of such an approach. I am also not talking about the “godly” utopic paradise promoted by capital and power accumulation apparatuses. I can see what these mean and foresee the dangerous and destructive consequences their intentions will lead to. Vulgar communism, the paradisiacal promise of materialism, is also primitive and dysfunctional, a kind of extreme variant of liberalism. In any case, we can easily understand from our daily experience that every promise made by liberalism stinks to hell.

The realization of the third nature would require the longue durée. A democratic system—as a regime for the realization of first and second natures at a higher level based on diversity and the expression of equality and freedom—only becomes possible if it develops the internal qualities of an ecological and feminine society. The human being’s social nature is such that we could reach this stage. Approaching the issue of different natures with this methodology could lead to more meaningful theoretical and practical results.

Another important methodological issue discussed recently is the relationship between universality and relativism. Interpreting this as either the universality of meaning or the particularity of meaning draws upon the same content. We are faced with a methodological problem that requires careful analysis. We could define this problem as a new level of the subject-object distinction. The rigid approaches of capital and power apparatuses are called laws as a result of the material conditions underlying these methodological problems. Calling the legalistic approach universality is closely related to its use as a tool for ideological legitimization. We must not forget that law is a product of power. We should also not forget that power is capital. The rule of power is called law. Law, on the other hand, becomes stronger, in fact, almost impossible to oppose, when it is universal. This is how it starts to build God from the image of humans. The human holding power cannot openly dictate, so he deifies his rule. He believes he can hold on to his power more easily by using this ingenious legitimizing tool. We must clearly understand that efforts of this sort have been a substantial source for all universalities.

Relativism is presented as the opposite pole but in essence is very similar to universalism. It denotes the state of the debased human being completely removed from any rules, approaches, or methodologies. Relativism leaves the door open to the extreme perspective that there are as many rules, approaches, and methodologies as there are people. Since this is impossible in practice, it is inevitable that relativism falls captive to the laws of universalism. While one view exaggerates the degree of intelligence in human society and pushes it to the level of a universally valid law, the other underestimates it to the degree that it reduces it to everyone having their own law. Social intelligence can be interpreted more realistically by treating universal laws and relativism not as opposite poles but as two intertwined states of natural reality. Taking this approach could lead to a more productive narrative. Unchanging universal laws lead to linear progressivism. That is the flaw of progressivism. Were it true that the universe was constantly moving toward a goal, it should have reached this goal long ago, given the concept of “past eternity,” which includes infinity. In contrast, relativism includes the concept of eternal cyclicality, but if that were true then existing universal transitions and developments would not have occurred. This is why universal progressivism and cyclicality are methodological concepts that are too flawed to explain universal development, which essentially differentiates by unifying and changing—in short, both approaches are methodologically flawed. I believe the methodology that is closer to the truth must enable change by differentiation and include both the present instant and eternity. Just as progression is cyclical, cyclicality involves progression, and eternity is hidden and inherent in the present moment; while, on the other hand, the totality of instantaneous formations contain eternity. All of this offers a clearer and more understandable methodological approach to establishing a regime of truth.

It is important to address some aspects of dialectical methodology. No doubt the discovery of dialectical methodology was an extraordinary achievement. Close observation at any point reveals the dialectical character of the universe. The problem here is how to define dialectics. The difference between Hegel’s and Marx’s interpretations of dialectics is well-known, and both have had very unpleasant and destructive consequences. The Hegelian interpretation, which led to the nationalist German state, had horrific consequences with the rise of fascism. Although the results were different, the narrow class-oriented real socialist practices of Marx’s successors also led to many negative consequences and much destruction. It would, however, be more correct to look for the errors made by those who misinterpreted these dialectics in major ways and not in Marx or Hegel. Furthermore, it would be wrong to attribute the origin of dialectical methodology to Hegel and Marx. Nor would it be entirely correct to attribute it to ancient Greek thought. Dialectical interpretations are abundant in the wisdom of the East. No doubt, however, significant additions were made both in ancient Greece and in Europe during the Enlightenment.

It is neither right to interpret dialectics as the destructive unity of opposites nor to interpret change as the becoming and the creativity of the moment in the absence of opposites. The first conception leads to a vulgar tendency to always see the poles as hostile, which results in nothing more than seeing the universe as unregulated and in permanent chaos. The latter approach leads to an understanding of development without tensions, devoid of opposites, lacking its own dynamics, and always requiring an external force that cannot be realistically validated as cause. We know that this is the doorway to metaphysics.

It is therefore of utmost importance to free the dialectic methodology by cleansing it of these two extreme approaches. We can observe a constructive rather than destructive dialectic in any development. For example, the human being represents a dialectical development that is possibly as old as the roughly determined age of the universe. Human beings not only consist of everything from subatomic particles to the most complex atoms and molecules but also carry all biological phases within them.¹ This marvelous development is dialectical, but it is undeniably a constructive and developmental dialectic. No doubt certain hostilities arise in the much debated class conflicts (to which we could add tribal, ethnic, national, and systemic conflicts), but it is possible to resolve these contradictions and find a solution in the spirit of dialectics by drawing on society’s extraordinarily flexible intellectual power rather than by massacres. Society’s nature overflows with examples of such solutions. In attempting to better explain these developments, ideologues—perhaps against their will—have been unable to avoid arriving at contrary results. The fact that they often find themselves in this situation indicates the ongoing importance of interpreting the dialectical methodology itself.

To avoid an incorrect understanding of dialectics, we must briefly interpret dialectics in comparison to metaphysics. Undoubtedly, the most unproductive approach of all time has been the metaphysical search for formation, from a creator, externally. The philosophy, religion, and positivist scientism arising from this approach have created a thoroughgoing system of “intellectual colonialism.” Nature may not have needed an external creator, and, if it did require a creator, that creator would certainly be an internal one. However, we can easily argue that metaphysics imposes “intellectual colonial regimes” that resemble an external creator on the intelligence of social nature. In this sense, it is essential that we criticize and overcome metaphysics.

However, what I wanted to address concerns another aspect of metaphysics. I am talking about the fact that human beings cannot exist without metaphysics. The metaphysics I refer to here are human society’s cultural creations—mythology, religion, philosophy, and science, as well as all types of art, politics, and production techniques. Feelings of goodness and beauty have no physical counterparts. These are human-specific values. Morality and the arts in particular are metaphysical values. What needs to be elucidated here is not the contradiction between metaphysics and dialectics but the distinction between good and beautiful metaphysical creations and bad and ugly metaphysical creations. Again, I am not talking about the dichotomies of religion and atheism or philosophy and science but about religious, philosophical, and scientific beliefs, truth, and facts that make life more bearable and attractive.

Let’s not forget that nature stages a great play of vast splendor that unfolds before the very eyes of humanity. On this stage, human beings cannot play the same role as nature. They can at best arrange their lives through pieces they construct themselves. The description of theater as the mirror of life has its origin in this profound truth. What is important is that we reduce the bad and ugly aspects and the mistakes of this stage life to a minimum and maximize truth, goodness, and beauty. When we speak of good, beautiful, and true metaphysics, we are talking about this profound human quality not the metaphysics that make us blind, deaf, and numb. I am convinced that these clarifications are of great importance in the methodological comparison of dialectics and metaphysics.

Notes

1 This so-called “basic biogenetic rule” was first formulated by Ernst Haeckel, in 1866: “The development of germs is a repressed and shortened repetition of the development of tribes.”