SIX – The Emergence of the Social Problem
6.1 Defining the Problem of Historical-Society
6.1.a The First Major Problematic Stage of the Monopoly of Civilization
6.1.b From Rome to Amsterdam
6.1.c Eurocentric Civilization’s Hegemonic Rule
6.2 Social Problems
6.2.a The Problem of Power and the State
6.2.b Society’s Moral and Political Problem
6.2.c Society’s Mentality Problem
6.2.d Society’s Economic Problem
6.2.e Society’s Industrialism Problem
6.2.f Society’s Ecological Problem
6.2.g Social Sexism, the Family, Women, and the Population Problem
6.2.h Society’s Urbanization Problem
6.2.i Society’s Class and Bureaucracy Problem
6.2.j Society’s Education and Health Problems
6.2.k Society’s Militarism Problem
6.2.l Society’s Peace and Democracy Problem
7.1 Definition of Democratic Civilization
7.2 The Methodological Approach to Democratic Civilization
7.3 A Draft of the History of Democratic Civilization
7.4 Elements of Democratic Civilization
7.4.b The Family
7.4.c Tribes and Aşirets
7.4.d Peoples and Nations
7.4.e Village and City
7.4.f Mentality and Economy
7.4.g Democratic Politics and Self-Defense
EIGHT – Democratic Modernity versus Capitalist Modernity
8.1 Deconstructing Capitalism and Modernity
8.2 The Industrialism Dimension of Modernity and Democratic Modernity
8.3 The Nation-State, Modernity, and Democratic Confederalism
8.4 Jewish Ideology, Capitalism, and Modernity
8.5 The Dimensions of Democratic Modernity
8.5.a The Dimension of Moral and Political Society (Democratic Society)
8.5.b The Dimension of Eco-Industrial Society
8.5.c The Dimension of Democratic Confederalist Society
NINE – The Reconstruction Problems of Democratic Modernity
9.1 Civilization, Modernity, and the Problem of Crisis
9.2 The State of Anti-System Forces
9.2.a The Legacy of Real Socialism
9.2.b Reevaluating Anarchism
9.2.c Feminism: Rebellion of the Oldest Colony
9.2.d Ecology: The Rebellion of the Environment
9.2.e Cultural Movements: Tradition’s Revenge on the Nation-State
9.2.f Ethnicity and Movements of the Democratic Nation
9.2.g Religious Cultural Movements: Revival of Religious Tradition
9.2.h Urban, Local, and Regional Movements for Autonomy
Consciousness is related to universal existence. An explanation of the existing universal order is only possible with the help of the concept of consciousness. What is interesting is how consciousness expresses itself. It seems that the entire diversity of the universe is a consequence of the passionate need consciousness has to express itself. We know nothing at all about the multi-consciousness of consciousness. The quest of consciousness for almost endless diversity raises the question of cause, and the question of purpose remains even more unclear. Famous philosophers, even some of the holy books, relate these questions to the universe’s desire to remember itself or God’s desire to be recognized by its servants. To me, the term “becoming aware” seems a lot more enchanting and enlightening. From the smallest particle to cosmic existence, becoming aware of oneself may be the answer to the questions of cause and purpose. The meaning we give to awareness cannot be described as anything other than life. The definition of life that comes closest to truth can be defined as becoming aware. Even more importantly: Why is becoming aware of such importance? We know that life without awareness is possible, but if we try to understand this intuitively we begin to feel that this is perhaps impossible. When there is an extended period of low awareness, the value of life gradually declines and even begins to dissipate altogether. Even death, which makes us aware of life, appears to be a game or an act of mastery on the part of nature that seeks to make life possible. For example: What would be the difference between being punished with eternal life and the tragedy of Sisyphus (a mythological hero who is sentenced to repeatedly roll a stone up the hill, because each time the stone rolls back down)?1 Grief about death is a reminder that increases the value of life.
Knowing means nothing other than the awareness of life. Something that you know is something that you have become aware of. Although we cannot say much about physical beings, with biological beings it is impossible not to feel a kind of love for recognition. As we move closer to the human species, it is as if this love has been realized. The advanced state of knowing can best be described with the word love. But the human is a strange being, because with the human we may also encounter qualities that are easily capable of betraying and destroying knowledge in profound ways. It seems to me this reality of human beings is best explained by processes in social nature, which we also call second nature.
Social science, as a concept, developed with Eurocentric civilization. There is no doubt that as long as social nature has existed there has always been some kind of discipline that we can call social science. For example, we can safely call animism a prehistoric social science. Is animism, the concept itself a development of the Eurocentric social sciences, merely the primitive consciousness of primitive people, as is claimed? Who issued the fatwa saying that today’s social sciences based on the subject-object distinction are superior to animism? The very the same social scientists! It is increasingly clear that the animist school actually offers a more valuable paradigm than one that leads to the sharp separation of subject and object that inevitably views the object as lifeless. It is clear that animism more accurately describes the universe than can a concept of lifelessness. Scientific developments confirm this. Can the fact that without the enigmatic movements of subatomic particles, which remain a mystery, no diversity can arise be explained by anything but animism? Although its adherents claim otherwise, positivism (the scientism of phenomena), a highly dangerous form of metaphysics, has also inflicted serious damage on the social sciences.
The civilization process that we refer to as historical periods brought with it a change in the nature of science from animism to mythology. In many ways, although not completely, mythology was shaped by civilization. The first distortion of consciousness and the first seepage of betrayal into the social sciences are related to civilization’s ideological hegemony. The power and capital monopoly established over social nature would not have been possible without lies, distortions, and people betraying their word. Mythology is largely imbued with animism and is, therefore, precious. But as soon as the hierarchical system and order formed by the triad of priest + ruler + commander came into play, mythological reflection took the form of the tales of heroes (semideification) and deification, making distortions and corruption inevitable. As long as this dual nature is taken into consideration, mythology can be a very instructive social science, and I believe it will become increasingly important. There is certainly much to be learned about history from it.
The solidification of mythology into religion led to a second kind of social science. Of course, the legacy of religion is not merely mythology. Religion has its own dogmas. Although it was predominantly shaped by the forces of civilization, the religious interpretation of truth by anti-civilization forces is a lot simpler and, because of their naturalness, a lot more realistic. This is what paved the way for contemporary science. These two opposing forces are reflected within monotheistic religions. While the dictatorial, punitive, and subjugating dimension of theology reflects the forces of civilization, its participatory, rewarding, and liberating dimension reflects the faith and thought of the anti-civilization forces. The Middle Ages overflowed with conflicts between religions and denominations around these two different views. Without these religious and denominational conflicts, European social sciences would certainly not have emerged. Taking the influence of Islam into consideration helps make this fact even clearer. And, of course, there have also been moments of wisdom and philosophy through the ages. These are no doubt valuable sources for the social sciences.
While the social sciences of the age of European civilization were the product of this historical legacy, they also emerged as a requirement of the great social struggles taking place. Basically, they were conceived of as disciplines, instruments for resolving problems. From the outset, the boundless exploitation and oppression caused by capitalism meant that modernity inevitably emerged weighed down with crises. While all sciences, in particular the social sciences, were put at the service of an exploitative and oppressive system, they were also given the task of explaining the system in a positive light and legitimizing it. The rhetoric of the new power and capital monopolies also shaped the social sciences.
Positivist sociology crippled the social sciences from the beginning. The main concern of positivist sociologists was to establish a republic based on the French Revolution that protected the interests of the bourgeoisie. British political economists, for their part, pursued the rationalization and legitimization of capital. The German ideologues in all fields were focused on the formation of the gigantic German nation-state. The leading opponents of the system, the founders of scientific socialism, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, wanted to turn these three rhetorical devices of capital into a science with a proletarian stamp. Their anti-capitalism and the related analysis in Marx’s Capital,2 could have contributed to the social sciences. However, by limiting the sources of their departure and system of opposition to anti-capitalism, they left all the structures of the system without defense against capitalist modernity. Anarchists, who have a more meaningful analysis of power, have, however, left the political sphere virtually empty. European social scientists of both political wings struggled with systemic problems rather than exploring social nature, in a sense, taking on the role of crisis regime experts. The world and history became secondary. We should not be surprised that social science is Eurocentric. It was not realistic to think that European social scientists could rapidly overcome hundreds of years of accumulated knowledge and science. Liberal ideology proved to be the smartest, finding a way to integrate them all into the system, thereby neutralizing not only the French Revolution but all the revolutions of that era, including the Russian Revolution, and all opponents of the system. It successfully transformed science into the science of power and capital.
But it would have been unthinkable that European modernity, the most abusive and power-centered system in the civilization process, could totally eliminate and silence its opponents. As this modernity developed it encountered strong resistance, not only on the ideological front but also on the political and moral front. The opponents of the system renewed themselves at least as much as the system did. As the system became global, the counter-system also became global. The civilization system’s hegemony over science was gradually broken. Slowly everyone began to understand that history can only be world history, and that the brief period of European hegemony is nothing more than a small part of this history.
In the wake of World War II, French philosophy, the 1968 youth culture revolt, the dissolution of the Soviet system from within, the collapse of the welfare state, postmodernist quests, and the liquidation of classical colonialism prepared the ground for the beginning of a new phase in social science. Freed of the obstacle of positivism and Eurocentrism, the exploration of truth is now on a more favorable path. A social science that makes social nature as a whole in all places and at all times the topic of research cannot be content with merely solving problems and addressing crises. On the one hand, it must provide a direction for physics, chemistry, biology, and cosmology, all of which are basically connected to society, and, on the other hand, it must orient the humanities, including philosophy, literature, and the arts, thereby playing the role of the queen of sciences. The family tree of science can only be drawn with the social sciences at its root. This would eliminate both excessive fragmentation and the danger of being too abstract. As with the general crisis, overcoming the crisis in the social sciences is a priority. Social sciences that interpret awareness of life as freedom and truth as the exploration of freedom provide indispensable guidance for moral and political society’s enlightenment and development.
The fact that I evaluate the social sciences in particular in this text relates to the scope of the text. The rhetoric of scientific socialism, which I have used for so long, has now become too narrow. I have always completely rejected liberal rhetoric. Becoming more familiar with anarchism had a positive impact on me, but anarchism falls far short of solving the problems before me. As I mentioned at the beginning, the views of some sociologists I hold in high esteem made important contributions to my analysis, but I still had to find my own way. Without establishing my understanding of the social sciences, I would have been in no position to proceed to other challenging topics. As I said it would be at the outset, this is an attempt that can only further unfold through criticism. I am certainly not one of those metaphysical and positivist dogmatists who believes that the social sciences can address everything. My multidimensional definition of the social sciences should serve both to avoid this danger and to allow me to be vigilant and honest with those who are interested. Once this was in place, my main focus was democratic civilization and modernity. The reason I prioritized the social problem was to better understand the civilization system and correctly lay a foundation for its opponents. I believe I did a thorough job of this. My criticism of other opponents of the system helped me arrive at an overall assessment. Although I do not completely reject the scientific socialist method, which bases its opposition to the system on the conflict between two classes, I recognize that this is a very limited part of history and is far from providing an analysis of society. I have tried to overcome this with the concept of a five-thousand-year-old civilization system whose development resembles the flow of a main stream.
If we are looking for a dialectical contradiction—and I am convinced this is necessary—it is essential to develop it at the level of the civilization system. I am aware that civilizations have been researched by many esteemed philosophers and sociologists. I didn’t want to add new research to the existing research but to open up to systematic and comprehensive discussion aspects that have not been touched upon or that have been treated incoherently and fragmentarily. In particular, I must emphasize that I applied the dialectical methodology Karl Marx used in Capital to civilization. I have often wished that Marx had done this himself; it would have been of great service to all of us. Nonetheless, perhaps the best support you can get from a master is to understand his methodology. The critique formulated by those who are interested and the social praxis that develops will determine to what extent I have succeeded. In fact, as explained in Capital, civilization polarizes and creates groups and opposition. Even the bourgeoisie-proletariat contradiction is only one of many contradictions that civilization created. In this sense, it would be more accurate to interpret my work not as in opposition to Marx but as an attempt to complement and develop Karl Marx’s views and evaluations on the basis of serious criticisms. It should not be interpreted as antagonistic when I point to mistakes and shortcomings in numerous areas (monopoly, capital, the state, ideology, positivism, history, civilization, market, economy, democracy, revolution, the social sciences, and especially power, the nation-state, hegemony, system analysis, etc.). I think it would be more appropriate to see this as according him and the other currents fighting against the system the appreciation they deserve, and thereby making my own contribution.
In the previous volumes of my defense, I tried to provide a broad analysis of the dominating and abusive (exploitative and colonial) branches of civilization. In these sections, I have tried to go into this as little as possible, instead focusing on the demos, the forces of democratic civilization, as the antithesis. I did my utmost to clarify this historical pole. I think that history, especially on this subject, is fraught with errors and shortcomings. It was important and necessary to highlight this with a thick red line, to say the least. The main conflict throughout history has not been among the dominant groups in civilization, as is so often claimed (the latest example is the evaluation of Samuel P. Huntington) but between the two opposing poles of civilization.3 There are, of course, plenty of contradictions and conflicts among the dominant groups. Monopolies are always in conflict among themselves over carving up the cake. The crux of the matter, however, is who was this cake stolen from and how. According to dialectics, the real contradiction and conflict is between those who produce the cake and those that want to steal it. On this subject, which needs to be thoroughly historically researched, the only thing I could do was to, once again, highlight it with a thick red line. This is exactly what I did, and I believe that the results will not disappoint.
I have also tried to give comprehensive space to the opponents of modernity. In doing so, I wanted them to participate in the work of building a new system in the right way. There was a need to categorize the increasing turmoil that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in a meaningful way, but despair was unnecessary. Real socialists and anarchists have to understand the need for renewal, while feminists and ecologists should know that they will not get far without building a system. They have no other choice if they do not want to end up being a continuous source of water for the mills of liberalism. Nothing can be achieved without engaging in politics and ensuring the development of a system or, at best, the fate of the real socialist and anarchist movements awaits them. I am convinced that I have sufficiently analyzed the cultural movements. The democratic content of these movements, which are trying to free themselves from the claws of the nation-state monster, is important. They can play a historical role within the framework of democratic modernity.
I have taken care to theoretically and practically approach the problems and tasks of rebuilding democratic modernity in both an analytical and a solution-oriented way, and I think I have succeeded in presenting my conclusions as striking principles. Democratic modernity has nothing to do with the search for a past golden age or a future utopian project. There has been plenty of material in opposition to the system, but we have lacked our own system. I believe there is an urgent need for meaningful narratives on this topic. What is important is not the term democratic modernity, but its content, which needs to be systematized. Otherwise, we will get stuck between “the poverty of philosophy” and the “philosophy of poverty” and make no progress.4 My analysis is intended to clarify and correct this situation. The intellectual, moral, and political tasks were identified in pursuit of practical solutions. There was a lot of turmoil in this area too. I think it has become sufficiently clear how the practical implementation should be approached. In particular, I believe that the principles I have outlined will lead to new and creative practical action.
Another important topic of this work concerns the qualities of the fundamental unit of research. Positivist social science contented itself with objectifying society like the other objects in nature, and giving a general answer. Scientific socialism emerged as a left-wing reflection of that understanding of science and was even more rigid and fixed on phenomena. Its contribution has been to classify societies according to modes of production, perceiving and applying universalist linear progressive positivism as absolute truth. This led to the division of society into primitive, slave-owning, feudal, capitalist, and socialist/communist phases. There is a certain fatalism in this; sooner or later socialism will inevitably come. This is obviously a dogmatic approach. The consequences of approaching all social activities in this way have been even more problematic than has generally been assumed. The result was not socialism but global capitalism, which scientific socialism unwittingly served in spite of its criticisms. The fact that Russian state capitalism provided the system with at least a hundred years of life probably confirms this.
Throughout my work I chose moral and political society, which I consider to be the very state of existence of social nature, and which I tried to identify and define, as my fundamental unit of research. My argument was that although phenomena such as the mode of production, class, the state, ideology, and technology have formed differently in each society and have constantly changed, and although they are significant, none of them carry enough weight to constitute the fundamental topic of research.
In contrast, I criticized the world-system and civilization analyses as one-sided interpretations that rest on closed and circular development. I tried to analyze and show that social nature, the qualities human beings will and must experience as long as they exist, is inevitably moral and political society, which humans cannot do without, and when they do it indicates the disintegration and fragmentation of society. With a long list of examples, I tried to show that even if, in the course of civilization’s history and under siege from capital and power networks, moral and political society has been seriously eroded and left to decay, societies have always found a way to protect their moral and political qualities, to respond to these forces, and to live in resistance to them. I analyzed in detail how capitalist modernity and capital and power networks have wrapped themselves around society, leaving no pore unpenetrated (the nation-state, industrialism, the media in particular, eclectic ideologies, security services, internal colonization, the extreme burden borne by women, and other factors). I tried to present a comprehensive analysis that showed how these developments inevitably create a correspondingly strong counterreaction, giving rise to opportunities for resistance and alternative ways of life for every individual and every social unit. I have also shown that moral and political society is by no means static but has been constantly evolving since prehistoric times.
Clans, tribes, families, and aşiret confederations, being subjected to hierarchy, division into states, and the transition from village agricultural society to urban society, and then to national industrial society, experienced a series of continuous developments accompanied by greater or lesser polarization. I also tend to agree that the civilization process has a continuous character, which is a back and forth of center-periphery, hegemony-competition, and the ups and downs of crises. I tried to analyze in theory and to demonstrate in practice that, despite all of this, moral and political society cannot be destroyed; that it will always maintain its tendency toward freedom, equality, and democracy; that through a shared understanding and the fulfillment of intellectual, moral, and political tasks these characteristics will unfold with maximum vitality.
I also tried to show in detail that while capitalist modernity bases its existence on capitalism, industrialism, and nation-statism, democratic modernity can exist as democratic communality, eco-industrial society, and the democratic nation. I did not define democratic communality as the egalitarianism of a homogeneous society but as any kind of community ranging from one person to millions of people (from women’s to men’s communities, from sports and arts to industry, from intellectuals to shepherds, from tribes to corporations, from families to nations, from villages to towns, from local to global, any society from the clan society to the global society) that carries the characteristics of moral and political society. I argued that an eco-industrial society would be a society where agrarian-village society and urban industrial society nourish one another and consist of ecologically adapted eco-industrial communities. I have defined and presented the democratic nation as a new kind of nation, or rather as a nation with multiple identities, multiple cultures, and multiple political formations, that is opposed to the nation-statist monsters, and whose basic political form will be a democratic confederalist practice and autonomous political formations—all kinds of cultural existence, from ethnicities to religions, and including urban, local, regional, and national communities.
Time and again, I have tried to present democratic modernity in detail as an option that, based on these structures, is highly solution-oriented and combines the historical legacy and the experience of the system’s opponents in the modern era and will allow it to continue to grow and eventually develop into a predominant option.
Another part of my analysis focused on the polarization of state civilization and democratic modernity, not only in terms of conflict and abuse (exploitation and colonialism) but also in terms of the likelihood of freedom from conflict and peace.5 Assessing the probability of and necessary conditions for sustainable peace is a very delicate but important issue. The civilization process has a rich legacy in this regard. There have been times when practice accorded peace more holiness and sublimity than war. Even during modernity, war and peace have been intertwined as everyday practices. In particular, an understanding that a mutually nurturing dialectic could very well replace the destructive dialectic, and, at a minimum, that dialectical processes are neither solely destructive nor purely mutually nurturing, could contribute to this process. But it is equally true that a broad and complicated spectrum of options could exist between these two perspectives and the related realities. Thanks to the evolution of science, we can better and more accurately understand that natural reality does not function according to a Darwinian philosophy of the survival of the fittest dating back to savage capitalism or according to the old metaphysical templates of a life free of contradictions but, rather, offers a highly rich, intense, and creative nature.
Just as it is wrong to interpret peace processes entirely as evolutionary, it is equally wrong to interpret phases of war as the midwife of the old system about to give birth to a new system.6 The wars between capital and power monopolies revolve around grabbing a bigger or a smaller piece of the cake. They don’t have much to do with peace. A real peace rests on two opposing forces of civilization accepting each other’s existence, identities, and right to autonomous governance. This begins between two classes and expands to embrace a spectrum that includes various tribes, aşirets, peoples, nations, strata, religious communities, cultural currents, and even economic groups. Once it is accepted that conflict does more harm to the parties involved, the possibility of peace emerges and is pursued in a process of dialogue and reconciliation. Whether at a local or global level, both within nations and between nations, numerous conflicts have ended in peace in just this way. What is crucial is reaching an agreement that makes it possible for the parties to preserve their identities and their dignity. As long as this is the case, peace is possible at every level and between societies of any size, within any group, and even between individuals.
An analysis of the five-thousand-year history of civilization makes it clear that for some time to come both poles will continue to coexist, because it seems highly unlikely that one pole could rapidly destroy the other. Even dialectically, this does not seem realistic. Real socialism’s premature attempt to build a system without analyzing civilization and modernity ended in its dissolution. It is important to make both poles clear in any theoretical and practical effort, not to let oneself be absorbed by the dominant, exploitative pole, while at the same time constantly finding new and constructive ways to develop democratic civilization and modernity as an authentic system in its own right. The more we develop our system, using both revolutionary and evolutionary methods, the more likely we will be able to positively resolve the questions of “duration” and “space” and stabilize the system.
Democratic modernity is a system that is suitable for real peace because of its fundamental elements. The idea of the democratic nation offers solutions from the level of very small national communities to a world encompassing nation. At the same time, it is an extremely valuable option for peace. With its eco-industrial element and its productive use of industry within society, it lays the groundwork for solutions to serious social problems, including unemployment, poverty, and hunger, which are, so to speak, the result of modernity’s war on society, and for ending industrialism’s war on the environment and establishing peace between society and the environment. Democratic communality offers each unit and individual in society the option of being a moral and political society, thus representing the most radical peaceful approach. What is clear is that the more democratic modernity develops as a system, the greater the likelihood that we will arrive at a dignified peace.
At this point, I have to issue a warning and at the same time beg for forgiveness: I use the terms of moral and political society, democratic communality, and democratic society synonymously. When necessary I did not hesitate to use all three terms to express a wealth of meaning. Clearly, moral and political society and democratic communality are reminiscent of democratic socialism and social equality—equality in diversity. Equality in diversity differs from the real socialist understanding of equality, with equality denoting homogeneity. To emphasize this, I felt the need to refer to real socialism as pharaoh socialism. When using the concept of democratic society, I am emphasizing the aspect of moral and political society that encompasses both freedom and equality. We must not make these identical concepts uniform. This is what I mean by richness of meaning. Making them uniform would impoverish them. I warn against getting entangled in contradictions because of the very frequent use of these concepts, and ask for indulgence for being unable to develop a different terminology.
I have not limited myself to describing democratic modernity as a counterpart to the three fundamental elements of capitalist modernity (capitalism, industrialism, and the nation-state). These elements are moral and political society (or democratic communality, democratic socialism, democratic society), as well as eco-industrial society and democratic confederal society. As I have tried to illustrate in the relevant section, I wanted to define democratic modernity with an even richer bouquet of characteristics. The twelve fundamental issues that I enumerated in relation to the social problem simultaneously explain the twelve solution-oriented characteristics of democratic modernity.
I have often emphasized that this work could be published under the title The Sociology of Freedom. In attempting to define the social sciences I stressed that the ultimate goal must be to develop the option of freedom. In any event, if we add that, in a way, to solve problems is to ensure freedom, then I see no difficulty in calling the social sciences the “sociology of freedom” within this framework. At least a significant part of the sociological work dealing with problem-solving and the promotion of an awareness of life should appropriately be published under that title. No doubt, sociology is not exclusively about freedom. Sociology should, in fact, deal with a broad and complicated social spectrum (prehistoric society, hierarchy, class, the state, the city, civilization, capital, the economy, power, democracy, the arts, religion, philosophy, science, politics, war, strategy, organization, institutionalization, ideology, ecology, jineolojî, theology, eschatology, and so on). Throughout this work, I have particularly emphasized that breaking moral and political society into many parts and treating them separately has major disadvantages and can lead to negative rather than positive results. As I have already said, I strongly agree that the best methodology is to examine social nature in its historicity and wholeness.
As I end another part of my defense writings, I would like to conclude with two interpretations: one from Socrates, the other from Zarathustra. Socrates often said, “Know thyself.” I imagine he wished to emphasize that those who do not know themselves cannot learn or know much. I believe that the human being is the sum of the reality, as far as science explains it, that stretches from the assumed big bang, at least fifteen billion years ago, to today and spatially across the entire universe. I both feel and know that. In this sense, knowing thyself is synonymous with knowledge of all time and the entire universe. Moreover, in his famous defense, Socrates speaks not of the gods of Athens, whom he allegedly disavowed, but of his inspirational spirit beings, the daemons, who visited him from time to time. This is knowing thyself through intuition and inner focus. This is in a way prophetic learning and prediction. It is clear that this is a more advanced way of learning than was idolatry. After receiving a reminder from my intuition, or my daemons, “Whatever you seek, find it in thyself,” I had no choice but to write in this way.
Zarathustra’s account was even more impressive. It is said that Zarathustra heard a voice when the sun rose in full glory over his much beloved Zagros Mountains. He shouts at this voice, “Tell me, who are you?”7 This account tells us that Zarathustra encounters God and settles accounts with him. I, on the other hand, am convinced that it is a matter of his reckoning with the presence of the Sumeric god-kings, who for thousands of years had threatened the freedom of the people of Zagros. In a way, he questions the sacredness of these god-kings, who are, in a sense, civilization itself, and accomplishes the Zoroastrian moral revolution. This revolution is about the dichotomy of light and darkness, good and evil.
I absolutely hate the exaggerations about me that are circulating. My passionate desire is to be understood in all my simplicity and to be a friend. With time I have come to better understand that my personality, which receives life in its simplicity, full of passion, as a celebration of friendship, has stood up against all those who have attacked me. When they attacked me, my question was a little like that of Zarathustra: “Who are you?” The lines that I have written reflect what I have learned from knowing myself and from my reflections based on the accumulation of consciousness that arose when I asked my attackers: “Who are you?”
Analyzing both myself and the sanctities of civilization, which appear in thousands of disguises, also means resolving the difficult conditions. When civilization divinities crossed all boundaries of morality and politics and tried to trample me, I questioned them with these lines. In a passionate atmosphere of celebration, this in turn made me familiar with my personality, my traditions, my people, my region, my humanity, and my universe. Getting to know means becoming aware, which, in turn, means living life fearlessly in all its richness and strongly defending it!
1 Sisyphus was king of Ephyra, and punished for his self-aggrandizing craftiness and deceitfulness by being forced to roll an immense boulder up a hill, only to watch it roll back down, repeating this action for eternity.
2 Karl Marx, Capital, vols. 1–3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965–1967), accessed February 10, 2020, vol. 1, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf; vol. 2, https://libcom.org/files/Capital-Volume-II.pdf; vol. 3, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf.
3 Samuel P. Huntington is the father of the “clash of civilizations” theory, an important talking point in the neoconservative movement that arose in the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union; The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
4 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The Philosophy of Poverty (1847), accessed December 24, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/proudhon/philosophy/; Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon (1847), accessed December 24, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy.
5 Abdullah Öcalan wrote all five volumes of the Manifesto of Democratic Civilization and the Roadmap for Negotiations in 2008–2010, when secret talks involving the Turkish state and the PKK and him were already taking place. In this respect, this incipient “peace process” is referred to here when a ‘process’ is mentioned, even if it is not openly addressed. At the end of 2012, these talks became public knowledge, which triggered the hope for peace and a democratization of Turkey and also formed the background for the Gezi protests. In the spring of 2015, President Erdoğan unilaterally ended the dialogue and opted for an escalation of violence.
6 “Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one”; Karl Marx: Capital, Chapter Thirty-One, accessed December 24, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch31.htm.
7 See, e.g., John T. Lysaker, Philosophy, Writing and the Character of Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 71.