TWO – Introduction

  • ONE
  • TWO
  • FOUR
  • FIVE
  • SIX
  • NINE
  • TEN

SIX – The Emergence of the Social Problem

6.1 Defining the Problem of Historical-Society
6.1.a The First Major Problematic Stage of the Monopoly of Civilization
6.1.b From Rome to Amsterdam
6.1.c Eurocentric Civilization’s Hegemonic Rule
6.2 Social Problems
6.2.a The Problem of Power and the State
6.2.b Society’s Moral and Political Problem
6.2.c Society’s Mentality Problem
6.2.d Society’s Economic Problem
6.2.e Society’s Industrialism Problem
6.2.f Society’s Ecological Problem
6.2.g Social Sexism, the Family, Women, and the Population Problem
6.2.h Society’s Urbanization Problem
6.2.i Society’s Class and Bureaucracy Problem
6.2.j Society’s Education and Health Problems
6.2.k Society’s Militarism Problem
6.2.l Society’s Peace and Democracy Problem

SEVEN – Envisaging the System of Democratic Civilization

7.1 Definition of Democratic Civilization
7.2 The Methodological Approach to Democratic Civilization
7.3 A Draft of the History of Democratic Civilization
7.4 Elements of Democratic Civilization

7.4.a Clans
7.4.b The Family
7.4.c Tribes and Aşirets
7.4.d Peoples and Nations
7.4.e Village and City
7.4.f Mentality and Economy
7.4.g Democratic Politics and Self-Defense

NINE – The Reconstruction Problems of Democratic Modernity
9.1 Civilization, Modernity, and the Problem of Crisis
9.2 The State of Anti-System Forces

9.2.a The Legacy of Real Socialism
9.2.b Reevaluating Anarchism
9.2.c Feminism: Rebellion of the Oldest Colony
9.2.d Ecology: The Rebellion of the Environment
9.2.e Cultural Movements: Tradition’s Revenge on the Nation-State
9.2.f Ethnicity and Movements of the Democratic Nation
9.2.g Religious Cultural Movements: Revival of Religious Tradition
9.2.h Urban, Local, and Regional Movements for Autonomy

TWO – Introduction

The knowledge structure of the capitalist world system is in just as big a crisis as its apparatuses of power and production/accumulation.1 However, their very nature renders knowledge structures more susceptible to free discussion, which creates an opportunity to extensively interpret the degree of the crisis in which science finds itself. The role of knowledge in social and power structures is more significant in this period than it has been in any previous period in history. There is an ongoing historical revolution within the knowledge and information tools of social life. Revolutionary processes, as crises, essentially also play the role of seeking regimes of truth. Hegemony not only takes place in the fields of accumulation, production, and power; we also witness fierce hegemonic struggles in the field of knowledge. Production, accumulation, and power structures that have not secured their legitimacy within the field of knowledge cannot ensure their permanent existence.

The positivist disciplines of science that reigned supreme until recently are not as anti-metaphysical and anti-religious, as has been claimed. There has been a growing recognition and discussion of the fact that they possess as strong a metaphysical and religious dimension as metaphysics and religion themselves. The triumphant natural sciences, attributed to Classical Greek society and the European Enlightenment, were dealt the most significant blows from within their own midst.2 The weakest aspect of the positivist sciences is the postulation of continuous progressive and linear development—no such structure and purpose of the universe can be detected. Furthermore, neither the subatomic world nor the cosmological universe can escape the observer-observed dilemma—because human consciousness is also part of this process. It is impossible to predict how consciousness could assume a role beyond this scope. Unlimited differentiation potential itself requires new interpretations.

Sociology—a Eurocentric knowledge structure—cannot get beyond the claim of positivist science enthusiasts that society can be considered a phenomenon, just like the phenomena in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology, and, as such, can be explained using the same approach. But the audacity of objectifying human society, whose nature differs from that of the abovementioned phenomena, does not aid enlightenment but leads to an even shallower idolization. Today’s discussions about science make it sufficiently clear that the philosophical statements of the German ideologues (who were recruited to deliver knowledge structures to nation-states), the science of political economy developed by the English ideologues, and the sociology of French philosophers were legitimizing tools for the apparatuses of capital and power accumulation. They provided the knowledge structures of the nation-states. German philosophy, English political economy, and French sociology ultimately could not avoid providing the basis for the emerging nation-state nationalism. We can comfortably say that these Eurocentric sociologies are by and large knowledge structures of the Eurocentric capitalist world system.

However, saying all this does not resolve the problem. It is now sufficiently clear that even the socialism—or sociology—of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, which emerged as the opposing worldview, is a very vulgar interpretation of society. In spite of all claims of opposing it, they could not escape serving capitalism—even more so than its official ideology, liberalism. This is sufficiently clear from the trends, movements, and state systems of real socialism, social democracy, and national liberation. Despite their highly noble traditions of struggle, if the abovementioned trends and movements, while acting in the name of oppressed classes and nations, have found themselves in this situation, this is closely related to their knowledge structures. The knowledge structures that they rely on—both in their positive and negative aspects—have produced overall results that have contradicted their intentions. These outcomes would not have emerged so easily if there were not a chain of serious flaws and mistakes in their fundamental paradigm and structures.

The extreme theories of relativism that impose themselves as another countertrend have also not escaped becoming the knowledge structures of the capitalist world system. But, perhaps due to their excessive individuality, ultimately, they ended up serving capitalism’s individualism more than anything else. This includes anarchist approaches. Criticizing capitalism—turning this stark opposition to capitalism into a discourse, as is often seen—has become a very effective way of serving it. The inadequacies and errors in our knowledge structures and our paradigms play a fundamental role in all of this.

Physical sciences (including chemistry and biology) do not only relate to physical nature as claimed nor do the humanities (including literature, history, philosophy, political economy, and sociology) merely relate to social nature. A better approach would be to accept the concept of social sciences in a broad sense as the intersection of the two sciences—because all sciences must be social.3

Agreement on a common definition of the social sciences does not settle the problem. What is even more important is to determine the fundamental model. In other words, what unit will form the basis of our evaluation of society? To say that the fundamental unit is social nature as a whole does not mean much for the social sciences. Establishing which of the numerous social relationships are of crucial importance is the first significant step in developing a meaningful theoretical approach. The social unit chosen will be meaningful to the extent that it explains the overall situation.

Various models related to the social sphere have been developed. The most widely known and used unit is the state, more specifically the nation-state primarily based on the perspective of the bourgeoisie and the middle class. Within this model, history and society are examined in light of the construction, destruction, and secession problems faced by states. This tendency, which is one of the shallowest models for approaching the reality of historical-society, cannot play a role beyond being the state’s official educational approach. Its real purpose is to produce an ideology that legitimizes the state. Instead of enlightening, it serves to conceal the complex problems of history and society. This is, therefore, the most discredited sociological approach.

The Marxist approach chose class and economy as the fundamental units and hoped to formulate alternative models in opposition to the approach based on the “state” unit. Choosing the working class and capitalist economy as the fundamental model for examining society has helped explain history and society in terms of economic and class structures and their significance. But this approach brought with it several important flaws. The fact that this approach considers the state and other superstructural institutions to be the product and simple reflection of substructures led to a slip into reductionism known as economism. Economic reductionism, like state reductionism, could not overcome the flaw of concealing the reality of historical-society and its highly complex relationships. In particular, deficiencies in the analysis of power and the state led to the oppressed working classes and peoples, whom Marxism claimed to have acted on behalf of, not having adequate access to ideological and political apparatuses. The narrow economic struggle and opportunistic state conspiracy—the idea that the state and power can be destroyed and then reconstructed—have served capitalism as effectively as its own ideology, liberalism. The Chinese and Russian realities make this perfectly clear.

We also come across perspectives that in interpreting history and society see nothing more than the ruling power and authority. This sort of approach is, however, just as flawed as one that chooses the state as its model. Although power itself is a more comprehensive unit of inquiry, even this approach alone is incapable of explaining social nature. This is an extremely important area of examination; the investigation of social power can contribute to understanding history and society. But reducing the issue to power has the same shortcomings as any kind of reductionism.

We also often encounter an approach that examines society as endless singular relational developments devoid of rules. This excessively relativistic approach, which can almost be called the descriptive literary model, can only cause us to lose our way in the complexities of social questions. The approach of excessive universalist models may appear to be the opposite of this, but it essentially plays the same role. Both approaches attempt to define society in its physical simplicity with one or two laws. This is probably the approach that contributes the most to clouding our vision and blinding us to the rich diversity of society. The positivist understanding of society deserves to be remembered as the most vulgar model, encompassing both excessive relativism and excessive universalism.

Liberalism, the official bourgeois ideology of the middle-class, presents itself as an eclectic amalgam of aspects of all of these models, establishing itself as a system by claiming to amalgamate the best aspects of each model. But what it actually does is to combine the most flawed aspects of all models, incorporating a few truths, and constantly presenting society with the most dangerous form of eclecticism as a model. It is the official perspective that colonizes and occupies the collective memory of society, thereby consolidating its ideological hegemony.

I had to present my first major defense, my work called Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilization, as it was, without doing much to develop it into a model.4 That defense was prepared in a rush with little or no opportunity for extensive research. It wasn’t my ambition to develop a model; I simply put my understanding of social reality in writing. Later, I had the opportunity to examine the models of Murray Bookchin, Immanuel Wallerstein, Fernand Braudel, and other important sociologists. In addition, I also had a basic understanding of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michael Foucault, and some other philosophers. The most important among them was Andre Gunder Frank, who compiled and presented the views of many thinkers in his monumental work The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?5 I came to view this book by a thinker I had not previously heard of to be the best possible presentation of my views. The fact that in recent years several thinkers have conducted similar research led me to think more about my own model.

Indeed, the essence of my defense already bore clear traces of Immanuel Wallerstein’s analysis of the capitalist world-system, as well as of Fernand Braudel’s integrative historical time. These works also contributed to my longtime effort to use a similar approach to explain the defeat of real socialism. Furthermore, not only did I have no difficulty in grasping both Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault’s interpretations of modernity and power, but I found them extremely close to my own. I cannot continue without mentioning that V. Gordon Child’s What Happened in History,6 written on the basis of archeological work carried out in Mesopotamia, broadened my horizons. I also studied many other philosophical works, treating them as if they were reports, and I had to make some decisions but did not ultimately claim any of them as my own “model unit.” My decision to present this more advanced method of analysis as a model in this major defense should not be misunderstood. My real problem was choosing a historical and social unit of analysis that would be both holistic and conclusive. All existing models, as I have briefly mentioned, have some correct elements as well as some faults and contain errors that we must avoid taking on. I was able to identify common deficiencies in all of them. Even the work by Andre Gunder Frank titled The World System, which reflects the model I come closest to, seemed to contain a serious flaw.

It was clear that Sumerian society, on which we based our understanding of the world system, was the first society where capital was accumulated. I consider the view that this world system, mainstream civilization from Sumer to the present, represents a cumulative build-up to be highly accurate. And I agree that this accumulation also has a historical continuity of hegemony and competition, center and periphery, and rise and fall. It is perfectly clear that the three pillars of this accumulation would be its economic, political, and ideological and moral dimensions. It is in this sense that the modes of accumulation are more important than the mode of production, and that the hegemonic transitions produce more important results than the mode of production. Frank was right to criticize Wallerstein for presenting capitalism as the only world-wide system in his analysis of the Eurocentric capitalist world-system.

It was an exaggeration to claim that European civilization is exceptional. As an extreme civilization, it could even be considered marginal. In addition, Frank’s analysis of fundamental social forms, including socialism, capitalism, slave-owning society, and feudalism, as ideological realities was an approach that came closer to the truth. He also pointed out that these concepts serve to conceal the truth instead of clarifying it. This is an observation the importance of which should not be underestimated and that certainly deserves attention. The search for unity in diversity could contribute to a solution, but alone it is inadequate. In addition, Frank clearly makes a richer contribution to the analysis of historical-society. I view his analysis as a system analysis with a small margin of error favoring a better and more beautiful communal life. However, its biggest flaw is that it risks presenting a closed loop that may seem impossible to exit. In the end, he approaches hegemonic power systems as fate, or, more precisely, he does not dialectically show a way out.

Immanuel Wallerstein’s decision to base his analysis of the capitalist world-system on a period of five hundred years is inadequate; clearly basing it on five thousand years might have been more productive. In the book The World System, we see traces of this in the writings of the many thinkers. However, the major advantage of Wallerstein’s thinking is that it provides a better analysis of the way out of the world-system, which makes it an important contribution.

Fernand Braudel’s analysis of capitalism, as well as his holistic understanding of society, presented in the form of historical terms,7 is an important contribution to broadening the horizon. That he sees capitalism as anti-market and emphasizes that power monopolies and economic monopolies have similar characteristics of accumulation is particularly significant.8 One of my favorite sentences is: Domination always secretes capital.9 Another important sentence for those who grasp its meaning is: Power can be accumulated—just like capital.10 Immanuel Wallerstein and Fernand Braudel both see the failure of the socialist revolutions as in part due to their inability to surpass capitalist modernity, an extremely significant observation that is also very instructive. However, these two famous thinkers need to be examined in the light of “economic reductionism,” something they themselves talk about.

I must point out once again that my understanding of the social sciences, which has been somewhat influenced by the key thinkers just mentioned and also shares the views of many other thinkers that go unmentioned here, is nonetheless unique in a number of ways. In this book, I go into more depth and systematize issues discussed in my second major defense Beyond State, Power, and Violence.11 My basic conviction is that the existing epistemologies could not escape being integrated into the power apparatus—even if against their will. There can be no doubt that Karl Marx, a thinker who took a highly scientific approach, best determined the true colors of capital. However, this important contribution was not enough to ensure his break with capitalist modernity. The knowledge structures Marx relied on and his very life itself were tied to this modernity in thousands of ways. I am not accusing him of anything. I am just attempting to make sense of his reality. Similar things could be said about Lenin and Mao. The system they envisaged, along with its many premises (including the knowledge structures and perspectives on modern life), was dependent on capitalist modernity. For example, they thought they could conquer major phenomena, such as, industrialism and the nation-state, by introducing socialist content. However, these fundamental forms of modernity—both in form and content—are oriented toward capital accumulation. Those who choose to make them their basis will inevitably produce capitalism, even if they are opposed to it. In all of these respects, I have made my criticism of real socialism perfectly clear. However, criticism is not enough. What option do I have to offer? That was the important question. It is also the question that I have constantly focused on.

Presenting the option of democratic civilization—a seemingly simple name that can be used until a more appropriate name is chosen—as a model for a systematic approach seems necessary and offers the necessary response to these questions. First of all, this option offers an alternative to the central world civilization system. Democratic civilization is not just a present and future utopia; it also seems very necessary and highly explanatory for a more concrete interpretation of the historical-society.

It is a necessity of social nature that there is resistance and an alternative to capital accumulation and the resulting instruments of power whenever and wherever they exist. Never and nowhere have societies lacked resistance or ever been without an alternative to capital accumulation and the instruments of power. The reason why they have generally been defeated must be sought not in the absence of resistance and alternatives but elsewhere.

If we don’t understand the preposterous stories of capital and power accumulation, then we will have difficulty in making sense of the concept of democratic civilization. The structures of knowledge have always vacillated between two types of errors: either they were completely absorbed by the knowledge and power structures, or they could not avoid being stunted sectarian denominations, because they were unable to independently choose scientific and political options and moral positions. No doubt, we must always remember the role of violence and the seductive power of capital. If we do not condemn these two notable views of knowledge structures, we cannot make the option of democratic civilization tangible. What we need to question is not the existence of democratic civilization but the knowledge and power structures and the deviant sectarianism, neither of which have been able to see it. These realities cannot be explained solely by inadequacies and errors in the narratives of historical-society and can only be transformed by a thorough revolution in the social sciences.

The power and state structures based on five-thousand-year-old capital accumulation know from their daily experiences that they cannot sustain their regimes without organizing ideological and knowledge structures on a massive scale. We have to understand that the social sciences cannot become meaningful truth regimes until they see that the hegemonic power apparatuses are constantly accumulating the two other components of their triad—surplus product/value and the tools of legitimation. It is not possible to revolutionize the social sciences unless we grasp that the structures of mythology, religion, philosophy, and positivist science are all tightly intertwined with the history of capital and power accumulation, and that they continuously reinforce each other to protect their common interests.

The second important conclusion to be drawn from the concept of democratic civilization is that it provides a very broad foundation for a revolution in the social sciences. My basic thesis is that all of the “barbarians,” nomadic tribes, lumpen, clans, communes, heretical denominations, witches, unemployed, and poor of history always lack meaningful movements and systems; to claim this is their destiny is to do nothing but generate and produce knowledge accumulation apparatuses, along with mythological, religious, philosophical, and scientific structures, in the interest of those who accumulate capital and power. History does not only consist of the domination of capital and power. At the same time, the knowledge mechanisms (mythological, religious, philosophical, and scientific) and their domination are always intertwined and in constant unity of interest with the domination of capital and power. The main reason for the failure of many prominent oppositional social science structures, especially the Marxist social sciences, was that they were based on social science revolutions that remained rooted in the history of capitalism and power accumulation and, as a result, failed to develop an alternative civilization system. No doubt many of the aspects we have mentioned here have been widely criticized, but the next step of incorporating these criticisms into a narrative unit that could encompass the whole of history is yet to be taken. An understanding of the world system could not be established, and as such narratives about it have never gone beyond fragmented efforts.

The third important point about the democratic civilization system is that since the agricultural revolution it has had the power necessary to develop urban and industrial elements, without allowing the excessive capital, power, and state accumulations based on the rise of the middle classes that play the role of cancerous cells within the society to take over. So “yes” to the city and industry, but “no” to the cancerous cells within them.12 If we look at the massive present-day urban industrial power and communication networks and consider in this context the terrible environmental destruction, women’s status or lack thereof, and the catastrophic levels of poverty and unemployment, it becomes clear that the concept of cancerous growth within social structures is entirely warranted. Today’s leading social scientists, including Immanuel Wallerstein, among others, along with the raiding barbarians (we shall discuss the concept of “barbarism” with a fresh eye), members of heretical denominations, rebellious peasants, utopists, anarchists, and, last but not least, feminists and the ever louder environmental movements have the potential to attain a holistic meaning and act against the threat of this cancerous growth within the social fabric. No society can endure the current accumulation of cities, the middle class, capital, power, the state, and communication apparatuses for very long. Even if society, tightly held within an iron cage, has failed in its efforts to break free, the daily SOS signals sent out by the environment clearly show that the problems have reached crisis and chaos levels because of the existing central civilization system. Thus, we think the way out of this chaos is to adopt an approach that is deeply rooted in the resources of historical-society and an analysis of the present in the light of the current state of these resources. Therefore, we assert that the future can only be secured through a central world system of democratic civilization.

In this defense, I focus on clarifying various dimensions of my main thesis. I try to understand history by grasping its universal dimensions, because I fundamentally believe that local histories are meaningless without a universal history—I believe this to be of principle value. Undoubtedly, even the most indistinct societies can be illuminated by the light of universal history. In addition, I also consider it an important principle that the present is history, and history is now. However, I must add the following to these two important principles of history: at the local level, the present does not just repeat history like a reenactment of tradition, rather, it plays its own important role in historical accumulation by adding its own unique features and distinctions. History is not just repetition: it repeats while accumulating new contributions of every place and time.

My approach will be clear as long as the shifts seen in my previous defenses and my other written and oral evaluations are considered against the background of these principles. Clearly my views cannot be interpreted either as dry repetition or as radically renegade. Anyone who is reasonably observant understands that development requires diversification, and that the primary principal of the universe is change through diversification. When one becomes two, this is not just simple quantitative accumulation; at the same time, two always becomes different to one.

Following the preface and introduction, the next section will focus on some methodological problems. I will emphasize the excessive internal fragmentation that has led to a crisis within the sciences that is linked to the overall crisis of the system, and I will discuss the need for a holistic approach to science.

I will also highlight another methodological issue, that of different natures, especially the diversity of social nature. I will explain why a return to nature (first nature) requires a radical approach and will address this in connection with the women’s issue.

The subject and object separation will be approached with caution, and the problems it has caused, as well as possible remedies, will be discussed. Its link with capital accumulation system will be illustrated, and the need to transcend it will be emphasized.

It is important to remain open to new approaches, even to important methodological dualisms, such as universalism and relativism, circularity and linearity, globalism and localism. In addition, a reinterpretation of the dialectical method is essential.

Clarity in methodological concepts can facilitate the presentation of the other topics. That is why it seemed necessary to treat methodology in a separate section in this volume.

The fourth section is titled “The Question of Freedom.” Since the democratic civilization system is closely linked to freedom, it is important that we clarify what we mean by freedom. The imperious nature of the central civilization system means that the libertarian characteristics of the democratic civilization should be at the forefront. In this section, the close link between equality and freedom will be analyzed. More importantly, the concept of equality—a genuine concept—will be interpreted on the basis of a respect for differences. Concepts of freedom and equality that are not analyzed in terms of their bond with the systems create significant problems within the social sciences. As such, the reinterpretation of these concepts in the light of our main thesis proves illuminating.

The fifth section deals with the critique of human reason. In attempting to define social reason, its functionality in terms of its theoretical and the practical, as well as its analytical and emotional dimensions, will be clarified. Where might the use of reason by world systems lead? Are there limits to reason as the tool for both creating and solving problems? How can we update Immanuel Kant? Such questions themselves are stimulating and indicate that the use of reason as a tool to solve problems can itself lead to serious problems.

In the sixth section, the emergence and development of the social problem will be examined. We assess the main source of the problem—the central civilization system—in different historical periods. The further ramifications of social problems are linked to the essence of the system, or, put another way, the accumulation apparatuses of capital and power are themselves the problem. We will, in a sense, sketch the history of the problem.

In the seventh section, we propose the democratic civilization system as an instrument for solving the problem. What meaning can we hope to find by re-envisaging history as social history? In response, we emphasize the unbreakable link between democratic society and history.

In section eight, a continuation of the seventh section, we define democratic modernity as an alternative to capitalist modernity. We will discuss why two different concepts of modernity are both necessary and possible in light of crucial lessons. In this context, we will reconsider the reasons for the defeat of contemporary revolutions.

In the ninth and tenth sections, we will analyze the systemic crisis of capitalism and consider a possible way out of this crisis. As capitalist modernity, the current state of the world civilization system, dissolves, what alternatives are there? How can we build democratic modernity? What are the obstacles, and what are the opportunities? What are the tasks of rebuilding? No doubt these important questions carry within themselves their answers.

Section eleven, which approaches the issue from various angles, is intended as a conclusion and offers a final comment on this overall undertaking. History neither follows a straight fatalist line nor moves spontaneously toward an expected goal. It is neither the sole source of all evil nor will it one day or another present us with everything good. Human sociality could make a beautiful life possible. Society itself is a tremendous source of solutions. But this will only be the case if we figure out how to protect ourselves from all the different deadly diseases, including the different types of cancer, understand our world, which makes a splendid paradise possible, and choose the beautiful life!


1 The author often follows Frank and Gills’s preferred spelling of the term world system and not Wallerstein’s term world-system. Wallerstein assumes that there are several world systems, each forming its own world. Wallerstein’s reasoning: “My ‘world-system’ is not a system ‘in the world’ or ‘of the world.’ It is a system ‘that is a world.’ Hence the hyphen, since ‘world’ is not an attribute of the system. Rather the two words together constitute a single concept. Frank and Gills’s system is a world system in an attributive sense, in that it has been tending over time to cover the whole world. They cannot conceive of multiple ‘world-systems’ coexisting on the planet. Yet until the nineteenth century, or so I contend, this has always been the case.”; Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand (New York: Routledge, 1999), 294.

2 For instance, the German theoretical physicist Werner Heisenberg, winner of the Nobel prize for his work in quantum mechanics, distanced himself from positivism; see Werner Heisenberg, “Positivism, Metaphysics, and Religion,” in Physics and Beyond: Encounters and Conversations (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); see Max Weber, “The Nature of Social Action,” in W.G. Runciman, Weber: Selections in Translation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and the works of the Frankfurt School theoreticians, Theodor Adorno and Erich Fromm, in particular.

3 Here the author is referring to Immanuel Wallerstein; see, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, Open the Social Sciences (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Sciences: Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991).

4 Abdullah Öcalan, Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilization (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

5 Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, eds., The World System: Five Hundred or Five Thousand? (London: Routledge, 1993); other authors include Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, David Wilkinson, and Janet Abu-Lughod.

6 V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (London: Aaker Books, 2016).

7 Abdullah Öcalan understands historical time as divided into the short-term, medium-term, and long-term and, thus, uses the formulation “historical terms” to reflect this.

8 The market hostility of capitalism is discussed in detail in Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th to 18th Century, Volume II: The Wheels of Commerce, trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992 [1979]).

9 Original quote: “Imperialism and colonialism are as old as the world, and any reinforced form of domination secretes capitalism, as I have often repeated to convince the reader and to convince myself”; Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, Volume III: The Perspective of the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 295.

10 Original quote: “Power is accumulated like money”; ibid., 50.

11 Abdullah Öcalan, Beyond State, Power, and Violence (Oakland, PM Press, forthcoming 2020).

12 In recent research, very large Neolithic settlements such as Çatalhöyük have also been referred to as “mega-villages.” These were organized, egalitarian, and larger than the original Sumerian cities, with their hierarchical structures.

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